University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and
Administration

James W. Martin School of Public Policy and
Administration

2013

Funding Defined Benefit State Pension Plans: An Empirical
Evaluation
Cezar Brian C. Mamaril
University of Kentucky, cibiano@gmail.com

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Mamaril, Cezar Brian C., "Funding Defined Benefit State Pension Plans: An Empirical Evaluation" (2013).
Theses and Dissertations--Public Policy and Administration. 3.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/msppa_etds/3

This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the James W. Martin School of Public
Policy and Administration at UKnowledge. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Public
Policy and Administration by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For more information, please contact
UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained and attached hereto needed written
permission statements(s) from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be
included in my work, allowing electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use
doctrine).
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the non-exclusive license to archive
and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known.
I agree that the document mentioned above may be made available immediately for worldwide
access unless a preapproved embargo applies.
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to
register the copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s dissertation
including all changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by
the statements above.
Cezar Brian C. Mamaril, Student
Dr. Dwight V. Denison, Major Professor
Dr. Edward T. Jennings, Jr., Director of Graduate Studies

FUNDING DEFINED BENEFIT STATE PENSION PLANS:
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION

DISSERTATION
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
Martin School of Public Policy and Administration
at the University of Kentucky

By
Cezar Brian Mamaril
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Dwight V. Denison, Professor of Public and Nonprofit Finance
Lexington, Kentucky
2013
Copyright © Cezar Brian Mamaril 2013

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION

FUNDING DEFINED BENEFIT STATE PENSION PLANS:
AN EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
Defined Benefit (DB) state pension trust funds are an integral component of state
finances and play a major role in the country’s labor and capital markets. The last
decade though has seen a substantial growth in unfunded pension obligations and a
seeming inability by states to make the contributions needed to cover funding shortfalls.
When coupled with even larger unfunded retirement health benefits, the looming
threat of insolvent state retirement systems pose both current and long-term fiscal
challenges to state governments already struggling with the ongoing economic
downturn and billions of dollars in budget deficits. The convergence of these factors
have led states to undertake various reform strategies in an attempt to move their
respective public pension plans towards a more sustainable funding path.
Using an asset-liability framework to describe the DB plan funding structure and
process, this dissertation advances the discussion over major pension reform efforts
currently implemented or considered by states. I show analytically the link between
various pension reform categories and specific DB plan funding components, and how
this in turn, affects DB plan funding outcomes. From this analytical framework, I derive
the study’s hypotheses on the relationship between DB plan reform-linked funding
components and outcomes of interest.
This study looks at three DB-plan reform-linked funding components: (1) plan member
employee contributions, (2) plan employer contributions, and (3) retirement benefit
payments. Four major funding outcomes are evaluated: (1) the employer contribution
rate, (2) flow funding ratio, and (3) stock funding ratio, and (4) relative size of plan
unfunded liability.
Utilizing a unique panel dataset of 100 DB state retirement systems from 50 states
covering a nine-year period of FY 2002 to 2010, I empirically test the following
hypothesized funding relationships: (1) States as DB plan sponsors have underfunded
their plans as indicated by their failure to meet annual employer funding requirements;

and (2) Increasing the employee and employer contribution rate and reducing the cost
of retirement benefits are associated with higher plan stock funding ratios and lower
unfunded pension liabilities.
Results from my fixed-effects (FE) panel regression analyses provide the clearest
empirical evidence to date that state DB pension plan sponsors underfunded their
required annual employer contributions. The financial condition of a state’s budget is
also shown to have a significant effect on the amount states are able to contribute into
their pension funds. I find empirical support for the crucial function of employer
contributions in determining the overall funded status of state pension plans. This
finding is further reinforced when I estimate plan stock funding ratios using a dynamic
system GMM (sGMM) panel regression model. The results from static FE and dynamic
sGMM models suggest no significant effect on overall plan funding levels from changes
in the employee contribution rate or the average retirement benefit cost. Lastly, the
results lend evidence to the significant influence of past funding levels on current
funding levels. It is recommended that future empirical research account for the
dynamic nature of public pension funding and related endogeneity issues. This
dissertation concludes by discussing the implications of the empirical findings for policy
makers seeking to improve the funded status of their respective state DB retirement
systems.
KEYWORDS: Public Pensions, State Retirement Systems, Defined Benefit,
Pension Reform, Dynamic Empirical Model
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
Overview of Public Employee Retirement Systems
This study evaluates the funding of state retirement systems over the period of
Fiscal Years (FY) 2002 to 2008. As part of my evaluation, I present a framework for
relating employer contribution behavior to the funding process of a typical Defined
Benefit (DB) public pension plan. I discuss the results of my research within the context
of its implications for selected policy reforms intended to improve the overall funded
status of state retirement systems.
While administered separately in a fiduciary capacity from the primary government
budget, public employee pension trust funds are an integral component of state
finances, and as a sector, play a major role in the country’s labor and capital markets
(Peng, 2008). In FY 2010, the U.S. Census Bureau estimated there were 3,418 public
employee retirement systems (PERS), of which 222 were administered at the state level
(Becker-Medina, 2012).1 Although the number of state pension plans represents only 6
percent of all public pension plans, these state administered retirement systems cover
90 percent of all public sector employee members and 84 percent of retirees and
beneficiaries.2
Cash and investment holdings of state pension plans, which in FY 2010 totaled $2.2
trillion, historically account for over 80 percent of all assets held by public retirement
systems (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012; see also Figure 1-1). To put the size of these asset
holdings into perspective – consider that 19 out of the 25 largest U.S. retirement
systems in 2010 were state pension plans. The California Public Employee Retirement

1

In this study, the terms and acronyms of public pension plans, public employee retirement
systems (PERS), and state and local government (SLG) retirement systems, are all equivalent and
used interchangeably throughout the text.
2
The U.S. Census Bureau (2012) estimated in FY 2010 that out of the total 14.7 million active
members in US public retirement systems, nearly 13 million were in state retirement systems.
During the same period, state plans covered almost 7 million of the 8.2 million total public
employee retirees and their beneficiaries.
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System (CalPERS) is the largest state DB pension plan with assets valued in 2010 at over
$ 214 billion (see Table 1-1).
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Figure 1-1. Total Annual Assets, Benefit Payments, Active and Retired Membership, All
State Retirement Systems, FY 2002-2010 (Source: U.S. Census Bureau)
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Table 1-1. Largest U.S. Pension Plans in 2010, Ranked by Total Assets (in $U.S. million)
Rank

Plan Sponsor

Assets

Total DB Total DC

DB Asset Allocation
stocks bonds cash other

1 Fed Retirement Thrift
264,013 264,013
--2 CalPERS
214,387 213,066
1,321 52% 24%
2% 23%
3 CalSTRS
138,888 138,630
258 53% 23%
24%
4 NY State Common
133,023 133,023
--55% 26%
1% 18%
5 Florida State Board
123,373 117,802
5,571 61% 25%
1% 13%
6 NY City Retirement
115,204 96,801
18,403 59% 34% 0.1%
8%
7 General Motors
101,541 87,807
13,734 27% 46%
--- 27%
8 Texas Teachers
100,280 100,280
--56% 22%
1% 21%
9 IBM
83,095 49,692
33,403 35% 47%
0% 17%
10 NY State Teachers
80,324 80,324
--61% 23%
1% 15%
11 Boeing
79,411 48,670
30,741 34% 51%
--- 15%
12 WI Investment Board
77,812 75,355
2,457 59% 27%
--- 14%
13 AT&T
76,183 46,090
30,093 41% 33%
1% 25%
14 North Carolina
75,314 69,746
5,568 50% 38%
--- 12%
15 OH Public Employees
72,157 71,727
430 62% 27% 0.3% 11%
16 New Jersey
70,803 70,230
573 44% 37%
3% 16%
17 WA State Board
61,637 52,035
9,602 37% 21%
1% 41%
18 Ohio State Teachers
61,007 60,587
420 65% 18%
3% 14%
19 General Electric
60,843 42,728
18,115 49% 20%
4% 27%
20 OR Public Employees
55,216 54,152
1,064 44% 26%
--- 30%
Note: DB-Defined Benefit; DC-Defined Contribution. Source: Pensions and Investments
(February 7, 2011). "2011 P&I Top 1000 Largest Retirement Plans". Accessed March 2011 from
www.pionline.com

As highlighted in later chapters, these substantial pension fund investments in
financial markets result in public pension plan revenues being highly dependent on
market performance.
When combined with local government retirement plans, the economic
contributions of public pension plans are not only gauged by the trillion dollars invested
annually in the stock market, but also by the pension benefits paid out to retired public
employees and their beneficiaries. In FY 2010, public pensions disbursed over $200
billion in retirement annuities, of which 81 percent or $ 164 billion was paid out by state
plans to 7 million retirees and their beneficiaries (U.S. Census Bureau, 2012). These
pension benefits, which grew by 85 percent from FY 2002-FY 2010 due to the steadily
3

growing number of retirees, are critical for the welfare of public employees and help
create economic multiplier effects for state and local economies (Boivie & Almeida,
2009; see also Figure 1-1).
Retirement income comprises a greater share of public employees’ overall
compensation compared to their private sector counterparts, and as such, offering
retirement benefits that are either competitive or generous relative to the private
sector, helps the public sector meet its workforce goals in recruiting, hiring, and
retaining skilled and qualified workers (Bender & Heywood, 2010; Franzel, 2009). In
particular, guaranteed and statutorily protected DB retirement benefits are highly
valued and preferred by public employees, and continue to be the dominant type of
pension plan in the public sector covering over 90 percent of state and local government
employees (Munnell et al. 2007, 2008b, 2011b). As a result, DB pension plans have been
an effective recruitment and retention tool in the public sector (Almeida & Boivie,
2009). Nonetheless, rapidly growing retirement benefit obligations have begun to exert
increasing fiscal pressure on states as concerns grow over the current and long-term
solvency of state run DB retirement systems (GAO 2010b, 2012a, and 2012b; Russek,
2011).

The Issue of Unfunded Public Pension Liabilities
In a series of widely cited reports, estimates from The Pew Center on the States
(2007, 2010a, 2011, 2012) indicate that between FY 2006 to FY 2010, pension liabilities
grew by 30 percent from $2.35 trillion to $3.07 trillion while plan assets only rose 16
percent from $1.9 trillion to $2.3 trillion. With the increase in liabilities outpacing asset
holdings, the funding gap grew from $361 billion in FY 2006 to $757 billion by the end of
FY 2010, representing a 110 percent increase in unfunded pension liabilities. Over this
same period, actuarially determined annual employer contributions that state and local
governments (SLGs) needed to make in order to cover funding shortfalls and maintain
solvency in their respective retirement systems, rose 50 percent from $48.8 billion to
$73.7 billion. The problem was that state and local governments were contributing on
4

average, 17 percent less than the required annual total, thus worsening the funding gap
even further.3 The failure by states to meet their required annual pension contributions
is understandable if we consider that states were facing an estimated $230 billion in
budget shortfalls and one of the worst fiscal periods in decades due to the economic
downturn and slow recovery (see NASBO 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011).
Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011a, 2011b) present an even more dismal assessment of
public retirement system funding by reporting even larger estimates than that given by
the Pew Center on the aggregate pension liability. They argue that the discount rates
used by states, typically around 8 percent, is problematic since it does not realistically
reflect the risk of the retirement benefit payments from a taxpayer point of view under
different conditions. At a minimum, Novy-Marx and Rauh estimate that the combined
total liabilities for state pension plans is anywhere from $3.2 trillion if discounting
according to the taxable state-specific municipal yield curve, to $4.4 trillion if using the
discount rate given by the Treasury yield curve. When the actuarial procedure of
recognizing future service and wage increases is used, the liability estimate goes up to
$5.2 trillion.4

The Impetus for Reform
The funded status of public employee retirement systems is a major public policy
and finance issue largely due to the huge investment losses racked up from two financial
crises within the past decade, along with looming increases in the annual total cost of
benefit payments as baby boomers begin to retire in large numbers soon. The
uneasiness over public pension funding is further heightened when considered in the
context of current and growing long-term fiscal challenges faced by states. As the
funding outlook deteriorates for state retirement systems coupled with its looming

3

Author’s calculations using Pew Center on the States aggregate state level data on actual and
required employer contributions.
4
In a series of papers, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2009, 2011a, 2011b) comprehensively examine the
issue over the appropriate discount rate for public pensions. For a more summarized overview
of the debate, see GAO (2012a, pp. 45-47).
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adverse fiscal implications, an increasing number of states are undertaking efforts to
reform various aspects of their respective DB pension plans (Mitchell, 2011; Munnell et
al., 2011c; GAO, 2012).
Anecdotal evidence of the growing impetus for reforms is noted in GAO (2012a) and
The Pew Center on the States (2010a, 2012) which highlight the increasing amount of
pension reform legislation passed in recent years. In reviewing annual pension related
legislation compiled by the National Conference of State Legislatures, the Pew Center
reported more pension reform legislation was passed in 2010 compared to the two
previous years combined, and the trend towards more reform continued through FY
2011 and FY 2012 (NCSL; see Snell, 2003-2010; The Pew Center, 2010a; see also Table 12). They also found that apart from the reforms related to benefit reductions and
contribution increases, more than a third of the states created task forces or
commissions to study and explore various solutions and policy initiatives. As part of
their review, The Pew Center identified five broad categories of policy reforms for state
pension plans (Pew Center 2010a, p. 8), these were:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Keeping up with funding requirements;
Increasing employee contributions;
Reducing benefits;
Improving governance and investment oversight; and
Increasing employee share of the investment risk.

A direct empirical examination of each reform category may not be feasible due to
the lack of data, and as most reforms are just recently implemented. An alternative for
policymakers is to have a framework by which to evaluate the rationale and outcomes
for each reform category. While such a framework is currently lacking in the public
pension literature, it would center on the premise that all reforms have the general
objective of improving the overall funded status of their respective retirement systems.
Furthermore, despite the different reform categories, the saliency of these reforms
reflects the fiduciary role that state governments have in ensuring their respective DB
plans are adequately funded. Hence, by design, the state government as plan sponsor is
ultimately responsible for covering any pension funding shortfalls through employer
6

contributions. This raises the question as to what determines the rate at which states
make their actual employer contributions, and to what degree they meet their
actuarially determined annual required contributions (ARC). Addressing these questions
empirically allow us to test the hypothesis that DB state plans are underfunded largely
because states were remiss in fully meeting their annual contribution obligations.

Table 1-2. Selected Pension Policy Reforms Enacted by State Legislatures, 2003-2010
TYPE OF
2003
REFORM
Increase
CO,
employer
CT, FL,
contributions KS,
NM,
NC,
OR

2004

2005

2006

AZ,
KS, LA,
MS,
NE,
OK,
PA, RI

Increase
FL,
employee
NE,
contributions OK

AZ,
NE,
OK

AZ,
MN,
MT,
NM,
SC, TX,
WA,
WY
IA, LA,
MN,
NE,
NM,
SC, WA

Reduce
future
benefits

KY, LA, KY, OK
SD, WI

Introduced
DC or Hybrid
Plan
Approved
POBs/GO
Bonds; OPEB
pre-funding
(2007 only)

LA

2007

2008

AK, AZ,
CO, CT,
IL, IA,
KY, MN,
NE, NM,
WA, WV

CT, MT,
NE, NJ,
ND, OK,
TX

AK,
CT, IA,
VT,
WA,
WV

NE,
NM,
OK

CA, FL,
IL, IA,
MN,
NM, WY

FL, IA,
KY, MN,
NE, WA

NJ

AK, IA,
NH,
NM,
VT

CO, IL,
IA, LA,
MN, WY

CA, CT,
HI, KY,
MS, MO,
NH, ND

CT,
NH,
NJ,
NY, VT

AZ,
KY,
NE,
UT,
WY,
TX
GA,
LA,
NV,
RI, TX

CO, IA,
LA, MN,
MS,
MO,
NM, VT,
WY
AZ, CA,
CO, IL,
IA, LA,
MI, MN,
MS, NJ,
VT, VA
UT, MI

OR, CO, AK

GA

CA, IL,
OR,
WI

2009

2010

AL, DE,
AK
IL
GA, IA,
LA, MD,
MO, NV,
TN, UT,
VT, VA,
WV
Note: Partial list only; a more detailed and comprehensive information of state legislature
enacted pension policies can be accessed from the NCSL website as compiled by Ronald Snell
at http://www.ncsl.org/?tabid=13399.
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Despite the prevalence of articles on public pension underfunding, much of the
empirical evidence is limited to descriptive estimates of the aggregate difference
between total plan assets and total liabilities. Even more common is research relating
overall funding levels and investment performance to governance practices (see for
example, Albrecht & Lynch, 2007; Hess, 2005; Schneider, 2005; Schneider &
Damanpour, 2002). Studies that do examine public pension employer contributions
emphasized state fiscal condition as a primary predictor of state funding effort (e.g.,
Eaton & Nofsinger, 2004; Munnell et al., 2008d).
This dissertation builds on the existing empirical pension funding literature by
constructing a framework by which to link the various pension reform categories to
specific DB plan funding components. The framework applies a balance sheet-like
approach to describe the state DB funding structure and process. With this framework, I
derive hypotheses on the funding relationships between the reform-linked DB plan
funding components and DB plan funding outcomes of interest. Specifically, the assetliability framework is used to evaluate the hypothesis that increasing employer and
employee contributions and reducing the annual cost of retirement benefit payments
improves a plan’s overall funded status.
Using a unique panel dataset of 100 state administered DB pension plans from FY
2002-2010, I empirically test my hypotheses with static Fixed Effects (FE) and dynamic
GMM panel regression models. I find evidence that state DB plan sponsors underfunded
their annual required employer contributions, and that employer contributions play a
critical role in determining the overall plan funded status.

Organization of the Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. In the next chapter, I review the
five major pension reform categories identified by the Pew Center (2010b) by
presenting the rationale and providing examples for each reform category. In Chapter 3,
I present the asset-liability framework used in this study to describe the DB plan funding
structure and process, and evaluate the relationship between the reform-linked DB plan
8

funding components and improved DB plan funding outcomes. I outline my data and
research methods in Chapter 4 and discuss the results of my empirical analysis in
Chapter 5. In Chapter 6, I extend the static empirical model from Chapter 5 by taking
into account the dynamic adjustments in public pension funding. I report and discuss
the results of a dynamic GMM panel regression model of plan stock funding ratios. In
the last chapter, I summarize my findings, discuss future research prospects, and
conclude by discussing the implications of my results in the context of efforts to reform
public pensions given the current fiscal conditions of states.

Copyright © Cezar Brian Mamaril 2013
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CHAPTER 2
SELECTED POLICY REFORMS TO IMPROVE STATE DB PENSION
FUNDING OUTCOMES

In the introductory chapter, I highlighted the dismal and worsening financial outlook
of DB state retirement systems and the saliency of these funding problems considering
the significant role of public pension plans in the country’s financial and labor markets.
States have increasingly moved to consider and implement reforms to improve the
funded status of their respective pension plans. As cited in the last chapter, The Pew
Center on the States (2010a) identified five major areas where states are either
considering or implementing reforms to address funding shortfalls, control the growth
in liabilities, and restore their retirement systems on the path towards long-term
solvency. In this chapter, I discuss the rationale behind the reforms and provide
examples in each of the reform categories.

Keeping Up With Funding Requirements
As a policy reform strategy, tackling employer contributions involves assessing the
plan sponsor’s pension funding behavior. Unlike employee contributions, which are
fixed by statute, employer contribution rates vary yearly depending on the actuary’s
assessment of a plan’s funded status for a given period (Peng, 2008). Actual employer
contributions are evaluated relative to the actuarially determined annual required
contribution (ARC). This measure is normally expressed as a percentage of the plan’s
annual covered payroll (ACP) in nominal dollars. The ARC is equal to the amount
needed to cover the value of employee services accrued in the current year and an
amortization of any unfunded accrued actuarial liability.
Because states can choose to pay more or less than their ARC, the extent to which
states meet their actuarially required contributions reflects both plan funding health
and the plan sponsor’s funding effort from a fiscal standpoint (GAO, 2008; Munnell et
al., 2008d; Young, 2009).
10

The plan’s ARC incorporates all the actuarial information including the costing
methods and assumptions in measuring the plan’s overall funded status and the funding
requirement or target that the plan sponsor needs to contribute to maintain a desired
funding outcome. Paying the full ARC every year signals that the state has set aside
sufficient funds to cover currently accruing benefits and to pay down unfunded accrued
benefits carried over from previous years. A failure to make the full ARC payment may
reflect a variety of conditions that include the following:
(1) The state government is currently in a weak fiscal position to fully pay the
required amount.
(2) The state government is either constrained or legally bound from paying the full
ARC due to its funding policy. The most common funding policy requires
employer contributions to be determined actuarially and for the full actuarial
amount to be paid every year. Peng (2008) identified 34 states that adopted this
policy but noted that it did not necessarily guarantee that the full actuarial
amount was paid. States such as Alaska, Kansas, Massachusetts, and New Jersey,
have actuarially determined employer contribution rates but their actual
employer contribution is ultimately subject to various legal provisions such as
caps on the rate of increase or legislative approval.
(3) Other states follow a funding policy based on a statutory contribution rate
(Munnell et al., 2008d). States may adopt this funding policy for two reasons
(Peng, 2008; p. 102): (1) to stabilize contribution rates over time rather than face
an actuarial rate that fluctuates according to changes in plan funding; or (2) to
correct for severe underfunding caused by historically low employer contribution
rates. The latter reason involves raising the statutory contribution rate to bring
the plan to a desired level of funding over a certain period. In order to mitigate
shocks to the state budget, a gradual rate increase schedule is normally used to
raise the contribution rate to the targeted actuarial rate.
(4) When a state contributes far and above its required employer contribution rate
or what it contributes historically, it is attributed to either a one-time General
11

Fund appropriation or government borrowing. Issuing pension obligation bonds
(POBs) and using the proceeds to pay off unfunded pension liabilities in one
lump can be an attractive policy option for states that have severely
underfunded retirement systems. Thomson Reuters Financial estimates state
and local governments from 26 states issued a total of 340 POBs between 1993
and 2006 (Davis, 2006). Research on the use of POBs has yielded mixed results,
and many of the case studies were limited to underscoring the poor design and
mismanagement of POB issuances in the past (Burnham, 2003; McDonald &
Cataldo, 2008; Peng, 2004; Williams, 2002).
Using cross-sectional data on 126 DB state and local pension plans from 2006,
Munnell et al. (2008b) found that two-thirds of public plan employers fail to pay the full
ARC due to legal constraints. They also identified lack of funding discipline, governance
issues, and fiscal characteristics as other factors that affect ARC payment.
The NCSL compilation of 2010 state pension legislation shows at least seven states
that enacted changes to their state DB plan employer contributions during the recent
legislative cycle (Snell, 2010). Some of the changes involved direct increases in the
employer contribution rate. For example, Iowa enacted concurrent increases in
employer and employee contribution rates for its Peace Officer Retirement System and
Public Employees Retirement System (IPERS). In 2010, states such as New Mexico and
New York issued provisions to either delay contribution rate increases or introduce new
amortization schedules for selected DB plans. Over the same period, differing funding
policies were also implemented. For example, Rhode Island removed a statutory
obligation of making certain payments to its state employee and teacher retirement
systems whereas the Vermont legislature passed a law requiring full funding of its
annual actuarial employer contribution requirement.
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Increasing Employee Contributions
Unlike their private sector DB counterparts, public sector employees are required to
contribute a percentage of their annual salaries to their respective DB plans (Munnell et
al., 2007). On average, employee contributions are fixed at a lower rate than employer
contributions but as fiscal pressures mount along with increasing employer contribution
requirements, states are now looking towards their workers to pay a larger share in
order to improve funding outcomes (Pew Center, 2010a, 2010b). Since 2008, half the
states have enacted increases in member contributions (GAO, 2012a). In the 2010
legislative cycle alone, nine states enacted employee contribution rate increases
compared to only five states in 2008 and 2009 respectively (Snell, 2008, 2009, 2010). A
review of NCSL compiled pension legislation passed in 2010 showed that the kind and
scope of legislated increases in employee contribution rates varied by state. For
example, Minnesota enacted increases in employee contribution rates across the board
for its general, public safety, and teacher employee members. In another example,
Missouri introduced new contributory tiers for new members of the Missouri
Department of Transportation and Highway Patrol Employees' Retirement System
(MPERS), the Missouri State Employees’ Retirement System and the retirement plan for
judges. In their plan, employees hired after January 1, 2011 would make a pre-tax
employee contribution of 4 percent of salary. Up until this legislation, Missouri plans
were non-contributory.
Other states passed legislation that implements annual increases of the employee
contribution rate over a specified period. For example, New Mexico enacted a 0.225%
increase over a four-year period from 2005 to 2008 for members of its New Mexico
Educational Retirement Fund; this started on July 1, 2005 at 7.675% of salary and
increased to 7.9% of salary by July 1, 2008 (Snell, 2005).

Reducing Benefits
In this approach to reforming pensions, reducing the level of employee benefits
improves plan funding by reducing the actuarial value of plan liabilities and
13

correspondingly the funding requirements. In practice though, states can only reduce or
change the benefits for newly hired and future employees (GAO, 2010). This is because
all states have strong legal protections for their pensions, either by constitutional
provision or statute, that prevent benefits accrued by existing employees from being
eliminated or diminished (Kaufman, 2007; Moore et al., 2000).
All the same, states are actively implementing changes to their respective defined
benefit systems. A review of state pension plan enactments compiled by the NCSL from
the 2010 legislative cycle reveals that twelve states reduced benefits for new employees
in their defined benefit plans (Snell, 2010). Benefits were reduced through a variety of
means that included adjusting the pension benefit formula and raising eligibility
requirements such as increasing the retirement age (GAO, 2012a). For example,
retirement multipliers were lowered for new employees of CalPERS and four of
Louisiana’s state DB plans. In Mississippi and New Jersey, provisions for longer service
requirements were made. In Minnesota, the early retirement reduction factor was
increased for newly hired members of its State Patrol Retirement Plan. In effect, the
retirement annuity is reduced by a certain factor upon early retirement for each year
that a person is short of normal retirement age. Another way states carry out benefit
reductions is through increasing the number of years used in the final average salary
(FAS) formula. For example, Iowa recently passed a law requiring the retirement
benefits for new IPERS members to be calculated using five years of a member’s highest
salary instead of the current three years (Snell, 2010).
Post-retirement cost of living adjustments (COLAs) are another type of benefit
enhancement that states are also trying to reform. Unlike their private sector DB
counterparts, most DB public pension plans offer COLAs to reduce the impact of
inflation on retirement benefits, a feature virtually unheard of in the private sector
(Munnell & Soto, 2007). Depending on the plan, COLAs are either automatically based
on a fixed rate or some percentage of the Consumer Price Index or awarded ad hoc at
the discretion of the plan’s governing body (Harris, 2002). The 2010 NCSL compilation
of pension reform legislation identified eight states that dealt with inflation indexation
14

of retirement annuities (Snell, 2010). States such as Minnesota and South Dakota
enacted provisional reductions in the COLA of retirement benefits contingent on the
improvement of plan funding ratios. Other states such as Colorado extended the period
after retirement before COLAs are allowed to kick-in whereas states such as Illinois
removed the compounding feature for such provisions.
Whatever policy reform states undertake to reduce employee retirement benefits,
states can expect to face legal challenges from their respective retirement system
members and public employee unions (Moran, 2010). For example, Colorado and
Minnesota which recently enacted reductions in member COLAs are now facing legal
suits claiming that the reduction in benefits were a violation of contract (Snell, 2010).
As a whole, because the majority of policy reforms undertaken by states to reduce
retirement benefits are limited to new and future employees, this approach to
reforming pensions may not have a considerable impact in reducing the existing
unfunded DB plan liabilities. At best, the empirical evidence suggests these reforms
probably serve only to lessen the rate of plan funding deterioration. In calculating the
financial impact of various benefit reduction strategies, Novy-Marx and Rauh (2011a)
estimate that early retirement practices reduce liabilities by only 2 to 5 percentage
points, 2 to 4 percentage points if retirement age is increased by one year. They
calculate that reducing COLAs by 1 percentage point lowers liabilities by only 9 to 11
percent; and even if COLAs were eliminated altogether, they find that the aggregate
unfunded liability would still reach around $1.5 trillion.5

Improving Governance and Investment Oversight
These types of reforms address how plan administration and board composition
affect investment policies intended to improve plan investment returns and overall
portfolio risk. Other issues associated with this policy area include the use of

5

In their simulations, the authors assume a baseline level of three trillion dollar in unfunded
liabilities (Novy-Marx and Rauh, 2011a).
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economically targeted investment (ETI) strategies; the application of ethical practices,
reporting transparency; and “prudent investor” rules.
The relationship between plan governance and investment performance is one of
the more relevant topics covered in the public pension literature mainly because
investment income comprises the largest share of public pension plan revenues.6 Data
from the U.S. Census Bureau’s Survey of State and Local Government Retirement
Systems showed that from 2002 to 2010, half the average annual total revenues of U.S.
public pension plans came from investment earnings (see Figure 2-1). The remaining
portion of plan revenues came from employer contributions and employee
contributions with an average share of 33 percent and 17 percent respectively.
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Figure 2-1. Total Annual Revenues for U.S. Public Employee Retirement Systems, by
Revenue Source, FY 2002-2010 (Source: U.S. Census Bureau 2011)

6

For a comprehensive review of the literature on PERS investment performance, see Schneider
(2005). Both Albrecht and Lynch (2006) and Albrecht et al (2007) provide an extensive empirical
evaluation of both public pension plan governance and financial performance.

16

Governance issues can have a significant influence on DB plan funding outcomes
because pension boards are directed to make decisions on investments, benefit levels,
and actuarial assumptions (Coggburn & Reddick, 2006; Hess, 2005; Schneider, 2005).
The way board size and composition determine decisions on investment policy and
asset allocation is critical since studies have shown that asset allocation can explain up
to 90 percent of the variability in the return on assets over time (Brinson et al., 1991;
Ilkiw, 2003). Even so, the empirical literature on the effect of board size and
composition on plan funding and investment performance has yielded mixed results
(Schneider, 2005). Some studies show that a greater proportion of appointed trustees
increases investment performance (e.g., Hess, 2005) and others find a negative, albeit
non-significant, relationship (Albrecht & Lynch, 2006). Others such as Mitchell and Hsin
(1997) and Murphy and Van Nuys (1994) submit that trustees elected by retired
members negatively affect plan performance whereas Doyle (2005) contends retiree
elected trustees have no impact on performance. A balanced board would seem to be
the ideal arrangement since having a board dominated by one type of trustee (e.g.,
appointed/ex-officio or member elected) is counterproductive because it may prevent
meaningful input from other trustee groups (Hess, 2005).
What is clear though is the definitive contribution of investment policy changes to
the considerable growth of asset holdings in the public pension sector as a whole.
Studies show that public pension plans with greater equity exposure in their portfolios
tend to perform better. For example, controlling for differences in risk tolerances
toward equity across plans, Doyle (2005) showed that plans with “a greater appetite for
investment risk” (as evidenced by a plan increasing its stock limit policy) exhibited
higher investment returns. Doyle argues his finding is consistent with basic finance
theory on the positive relationship between risk and return and goes on to cite research
showing the extensive impact of the equities market on public fund investment
performance. This partly explains why the strong market performance in the 1990s led
a growing number of state governments to increase the equity exposure of their plan
asset portfolios as a way to solve underfunding problems, such that by 1996, the three
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remaining states that banned equity investments lifted their respective prohibitions
(Useem & Hess, 2001). By 2000, due to the strong and sustained stock market growth
during this period, half of all state retirement systems were fully funded (Pew Center,
2007; Young et al., 2006).
Unfortunately, the period of impressive gains in equity asset values of public pension
plans also saw numerous benefit enhancements enacted by state legislatures in the
form of shortened vesting and service requirements, increased benefit formula
multipliers, reductions in employer and employee contributions, coupled with abusive
practices related to boosting employees’ final pay earnings (CanagaRetna, 2004; Pew
Center, 2010a; Schieber, 2011). A weakening economy that began in 2000 with the
dot.com bust followed by the attacks of 9/11 saw the S&P 500 fall 16 and 19 percent in
2001 and 2002, respectively. With falling asset values and upward pressure on liabilities
due to the cumulative impact of contribution shortfalls and benefit enhancements
taking hold, state DB pension plan funding ratios started to decline along with a marked
growth in unfunded pension liabilities. Because most plans apply multi-year asset
valuation smoothing, the effect of poor investments returns from the 2001-2002 period
were still being felt five years later in the funding levels of several state plans (Pew
Center, 2007).7
Consecutive years of positive investment returns following the 2001-2002 financial
crises help fuel a recovery in pension plan assets and overall funding levels steadily
improved until the market once again collapsed in 2008. Munnell et al. (2008a)
estimates that between October 2007 and October 2008, the value of equity assets for
state and local defined benefit plans collectively declined by around $1 trillion. In
response to substantial pension plan investment losses, several states are undertaking
efforts to professionalize their investment oversight that include the use of specialized
investment bodies separate from the board; selecting board members who have

7

Just as it was after the 2001-2002 stock market downturn, the impact of the 2008-2009
financial crisis will also be felt over time as most plans continue to apply asset valuation
smoothing methods in order to minimize contribution rate increases that following such funding
shortfalls (Munnell et al., 2010).
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financial investment expertise and experience; and increasing the competitiveness of
the procurement process and performance review of consulting and investing services
(Pew Center, 2010).

Sharing the Risk with Employees
This reform category centers on state efforts to transition away from DB type plans
toward defined contribution (DC) and hybrid pension plans. After experiencing severe
investment losses in 2008, several states have considered revisiting this policy option as
a way of improving the funded status of their retirement systems (Munnell et al., 2011b;
Pew Center, 2010a, 2010b).
DC plans, which are far more prevalent in the private sector, differ from DB plans in
several ways and some of their basic differences, along with a hybrid example, cash
balance plans, are listed in Table 2-1. In a DB plan, retirement benefits are calculated
using a predetermined formula utilizing actuarial evaluations of tenure, retirement age,
and salary (Hustead, 2001); regular contributions are made by the DB plan sponsor and
members, and fund assets are held in a trust and managed by professional investors
(Munnell et al., 2007).
In contrast to DB plans, DC plans involve participants and/or sponsors making prespecified contributions with the employee participant shouldering the risk of their own
investment decisions (CanagaRetna, 2004). The future benefits received under a DC plan
is a function of the contribution level and outcomes in the investment choices made by
the participants (Munnell et al., 2008b). Proponents calling for public DB plans to shift to
DC systems often cite cost containment, portability, and flexibility as a major benefit
(CanagaRetna, 2004; Pew Center, 2007; Munnell et al., 2011b).
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Other pension plans such as Cash Balance, Deferred Compensation, Deferred
Retirement Option Programs (DROPs), or plans that incorporate a combination of DB
and DC components, are referred to as hybrid systems.8

Table 2-1. Defined Benefit, Defined Contribution, and Hybrid Pension Plan
Characteristics
Traditional Defined Benefit
(DB) Plans

Defined Contribution (DC)
Plans

Common Hybrid
Example: Cash
Balance Plans
Employer

Funding /
Contributions

Typically by employer only

Employee determines wage
contribution rate; employer
may also contribute

Financial Market
Risk Borne By
Benefits
Determined By

Employer

Employee

Employer

Formula based on years of
service and final or highest
average pay

Contributions (based on
current wages) and
investment returns on
those contributions

Enrollment and
Vesting

Eligibility and participation
are typically automatic.
Participants may need to
work up to 10 years for full
vesting.

How Benefits Are
Typically Paid at
Retirement and
general risk
associated

Typically payable as life
annuities, but may have
lump sum option. Annuities
lose purchasing power if
not indexed to inflation.

May require waiting for
eligibility and sign-up by
employee. May need to
work up to 6 years to fully
vest in employer matching
contributions
Lump Sum; typically by
withdrawing from total
balances, and must be
managed to last throughout
retirement.

Pay Credits
(based on
current wages
and interest
credits)
Varies; depends
on plan sponsor
arrangement

Access to Funds
for Current
Workers Prior to
Retirement
Portability

No

Yes (through loans and
hardship withdrawals)

Generally not portable.
Sometimes unavailable
until beneficiary reaches
specified retirement age.

Portable; can be left in
plan, rolled over to an IRA,
or cashed out

Annuity or Lump
Sum based on
account balance
of each
participant
No

Source: Adapted from Gale and Orszag (2003); and GAO (2007)

8

For an overview of the different type of hybrid pension plans, see Coggburn and Reddick (2006,
pp. 431-435). A more detailed discussion of cash balance plans is found in Rappaport et al
(1997).
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For most hybrid plans, the pension sponsor still retains the investment risk but
reduces it in most cases by guaranteeing a relatively low rate of return associated with
lower risk investments (Clark & Haley, 2001). In Ohio and Washington, state employees
can opt to sign for a combined plan in which employer contributions fund a lower but
guaranteed retirement benefit, while employee contributions are invested separately in
a defined contribution plan (Pew Center 2007). Oregon adopted a similar hybrid
approach to pension plan investing in 2003 when it allowed employees to invest in a
portfolio mirroring that of Oregon’s own DB plan and to date, 70 percent of Oregon’s DC
assets are invested this way (Olleman, 2007). According to The Pew Center (2007),
Nebraska took note of Oregon’s cost savings from the hybrid program and decided to
adopt a cash-balance plan, in which employees and the state both make annual
contributions and are guaranteed a 5 percent annual return. They found the plan works
especially well for risk-averse employees who also prefer the convenience of not having
to make their own investment decisions.
The differences between DC, hybrid, and DB plans, along with the debate over
shifting away from DB public plans to address underfunding problems, has been
extensively covered in the literature.9 Giertz and Papke (2007) argue though that this
debate has generally emphasized extraneous issues, and when actually directed toward
underfunding issues, plan type ultimately does not matter because all plans can be
modified accordingly. From the policymaker’s perspective, the objective essentially is to
shift the investment risk from the state government or plan sponsor to the plan member
employee. Other factors that determine whether to pursue a DC and hybrid plans
related to whether governments can save money by making the transition away from
DB plans (Munnell et al., 2011b; Frank et al., 2011). One area where cost savings are
expected from requiring new employees to join DC plans is from lower future DB
payments as the number of DB plan members begin to diminish upon retirement (Fore

9

For a more comprehensive review of DC/Hybrid public pension plans, see Munnell et al.
(2011b) and Frank et al. (2011). See also Beshears et al. (2011) for a behavioral economics
perspective on the adoption of public sector DC and hybrid systems.
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2001). Nevertheless, the empirical evidence from the few cases where states have
introduced a DC system is that adopting a DC plan “does nothing to take care of
unfunded obligations” (Olleman 2007, p. 5). The Pew Center (2007) similarly argued that
shifting to a DC system does not ensure states will start adequately funding their
pension plans. Furthermore, the transition away from a DB system brings up a common
public sector human resources issue in relation to its impact on recruiting and retaining
a quality workforce (Frank et al., 2011).
Consequently, despite the overwhelming private sector trend towards DC plans, DB
systems are expected to remain dominant in the public sector due to the public pension
regulatory environment and the nature of the public sector workforce (Almeida et al.,
2009; Munnell et al., 2008b, 2011b). Compared to the private sector, the public sector
workforce is older, more risk averse, less mobile, and more unionized (Munnell et al.,
2007).
To date, DC and hybrid systems still make up a very small fraction of state and local
pension plans and remain for the most part limited to new employees or as a voluntary
or supplemental option for states that do offer them (Beshears et al., 2011; Pew Center,
2012).10 Apart from Nebraska, which ran a DC plan as its primary retirement system
from 1967 to 2002, no state has moved completely away from DB plans (The Pew
Center, 2010a). According to Munnell et al. (2011b), since 1996, few states have
adopted a primary DC or Hybrid Plan for new hires: Alaska and Michigan have
“mandatory defined contribution” plans; five states have “mandatory hybrid” plans (GA,
IN, MI, OR, and UT); and another seven states offer new employees a choice between
DC or Hybrid as the primary plan. Furthermore, they report that from 2008 onwards,
only Georgia, Michigan, and Utah have introduced new hybrid plans in which new
employees accrue retirement income under both a DB and DC plan.

10

Beshears et al. (2011) cited findings from a 2009 Pension and Investment (Volume 38, No. 3, p.
13) survey of the top 1000 U.S. Pension Funds that showed, only 6 percent of total public plan
assets were managed under a DC plan. The same survey showed 94 of the 222 largest public
pension plans have a DC component, of which 38 were DC plans with over $1 billion in assets.
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To date, empirical data on the financial impact of introducing DC/Hybrid plans on
the overall funded status of state retirement systems is lacking. This is primarily due to
the limited adoption of DC/Hybrid plans and the difficulty in making comparative
evaluations across plans given the variety of contribution and investment arrangements.
The research so far has failed to establish the willingness of current vested public
employees to give up their highly coveted DB plan memberships and the (guaranteed)
retirement benefits that accompany it. Additionally, several other factors also
contribute to the lack of DC/Hybrid pension plan adoption in the public sector. Some of
the more widely identified constraints were related to legal challenges, human resource
implications, and the financial illiteracy of public employee participants (Frank, 2012).

Concluding Remarks
My discussion in this chapter of the various public pension reform efforts reflects
the states’ recognition of the serious fiscal implications if they fail to move their
retirement systems on a path to long-term solvency. In reviewing the information
provided by the National Conference of State Legislature (NCSL) database of annual
enacted legislation summaries, the Pew Center of the States (2010a, 2010b, 2012)
suggest a growing momentum for reform among the states based on the increasing
number of legislative pension reform related initiatives passed in recent years. As
introduced in the previous chapter, the Pew Center (2010a) categorized reform efforts
into five broad areas: (1) keeping up with funding requirements; (2) increasing
employee contributions; (3) reducing benefits; (4) improving governance and
investment oversight; and (5) sharing the investment risk with employees through the
adoption of Defined Contribution and Hybrid Plans.
I discussed the rationale behind each reform category and cited recently applied
examples from information available in the NCSL database and various reports. The lack
of data makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of the reforms largely because
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most of the reforms have been enacted fairly recently.11 For now, most of the analysis
has been limited to studies that simulate the assumed impact of selected reforms in
order to project future funding levels (e.g., Novy Marx & Rauh, 2011b; Munnell et al.,
2010). Despite the simulation-type studies, questions remain about how effective all
the reforms will truly be in addressing the overall public pension funding situation when
the overwhelming majority of the reforms are applied solely to new and future public
employee hires. This is especially true for reform efforts related to reducing benefits and
increasing employee contribution rates which are generally established in state
constitutions or by statute (The Pew Center, 2010a).12
I found that apart from the Pew Center and NCSL reports, most of the discussion
over public pension reforms has been limited to presenting anecdotal evidence in case
studies and journalist reporting. When it comes to the related empirical public pension
literature, much of the analysis emphasizes plan funding and investment performance
as a function of plan governance practices and state fiscal factors. This is not surprising
given how overall funding levels of public pensions are largely determined by their
investment income, and the longstanding challenging fiscal environment states have
been operating under.
Granted that a direct empirical examination of each reform category may not be
feasible, a useful alternative for policymakers would be a holistic framework by which to
evaluate the rationale behind each reform category. While such a framework is
currently lacking in the public pension literature, it would be grounded on the premise
that all reforms have the general objective of improving the overall funded status of
11

A more feasible approach is to utilize an individual plan-level analysis that looks into a specific
reform and its impact on plan funding levels since a plan’s actuary firm will likely have the data
needed to conduct a thorough actuarial valuation of future assets and liabilities. Just as likely
too, is that the state will have already commissioned the actuarial analysis prior to deciding on
initiating the legislative process.
12
In the same report, the Pew Center (2010a, p. 31) cites Ron Snell, the lead administrator of
the NCSL database, as stating that judges frequently have held that states cannot modify
pension contracts with existing employees. “Once granted, a pension is a contractual obligation
of the employer, so that in most states it is impossible to cut the promise of a future benefit
(Ron Snell, “Pension Tension,” State Legislatures, National Conference of State Legislatures,
May, 2008.)”
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their respective retirement systems. The framework is used to show analytically how
each reform category is linked to a specific DB plan funding component. From there, I
derive hypotheses relating each reform category to improved funding levels through
changes in the relevant funding components and its impact on selected DB plan funding
outcomes. In the next chapter, I outline such an analytical framework that utilizes the
DB plan funding structure and process to relate reform-linked-funding components to
improved funding outcomes.

Copyright © Cezar Brian Mamaril 2013
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CHAPTER 3
USING A SIMPLE ASSET-LIABILITY FRAMEWORK TO EVALUATE STATE
DB PENSION FUNDING

In the last chapter, I discussed how an increasing number of states are enacting
reforms in an effort to restore their respective retirement systems on the path towards
long-term solvency. These reforms fall into five broad categories and deal with fulfilling
employer funding obligations, increasing member contributions, reducing retirement
benefits, improving investment performance through better governance, and
introducing DC/hybrid plans that apportions more of the risk to the participating
employee members. Despite the growing impetus for public pension reforms,
implementation is still largely limited to new employees and future hires. Hence, the
effectiveness of reform efforts to improve state DB pension funding outcomes is unclear
at this point because it does not address the pension liabilities already accrued by the
vast majority of vested public employee participants. Another challenge is the lack of
empirical data on reform impacts to analyze as most reforms were enacted recently in
light of the 2007-2009 financial crises.13
In this chapter, I outline a simple asset-liability framework to describe the basic
structure and process of funding a typical DB state plan. I use this “balance-sheet like
approach” to identify key funding components and incorporate the actuarial concepts
and selected measures of pension plan funding. Instead of directly examining the impact
of individual pension reform policies, I take the broad categories of reform strategies
listed in Chapter 2 and show analytically how each category is linked or addresses a
specific funding component. Within this framework, I present my hypotheses of how
plan funding outcomes are affected by changes in the various funding components. Of
interest is the impact on plan funding from increasing the employer and employee

13

Apart from the actuarial valuations, policy simulation studies that present projected funding
impacts are more common. For example, see Munnell et al. (2011c) and Novy-Marx and Rauh
(2011a).
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contributions and reducing retirement benefit payments. Lastly, I highlight the fiduciary
role that state governments have in ensuring the solvency of their respective DB
retirement systems. Using my asset-liability framework, I model the impact on plan
funding when states fail to keep with their employer contribution requirements.

Actuarial Valuation of Plan Assets and Liabilities
Prior to developing my analytical framework, I first give a brief overview of the
actuarial valuation process and the relevant funding indicators. Consider first that the
objective of DB plan funding is to build up a fund of investment assets from the
contributions of both the government employer (plan sponsor) and employees (plan
members), so that the income from and capital value of those assets are available to
finance pension obligations upon the retirement of an employee (Blake, 2006a; Blake,
2006b). The required size and maturity structure of the fund’s assets necessary to
match the maturity structure of its liabilities are all determined actuarially.
Since 1994, the actuarial methods used in valuing state DB plan contributions,
assets, and liabilities follow the accounting and financial reporting standards established
under GASB Statements 25 and 27 (Peng, 2008).14 GASB 27 details how plan sponsors
are to measure and recognize the annual pension cost and unfunded liability and GASB
25 specifies the guidelines for reporting funding information in the financial statement
(Peng, 2009). Below is a summary list by Munnell et al. (2008e, p. 3) of the GASB 25/27
guidelines and their corresponding parameters:
(1) Actuarial valuations are performed at least biennially, and present discounted
value of future benefits should reflect all pension benefits, including ad hoc costof-living increases.

14

GASB Statement No. 25 “Financial Reporting for Defined Benefit Pension Plans and Note
Disclosures for Defined Contribution Plans” and GASB Statement No. 27 “Accounting for
Pensions by State and Local Government Employers” were issued concurrently in November
1994 in order to fill “a void that existed in accounting standards related to accounting and
reporting pension costs” (Ruppel 2005, p. 220).
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(2) Actuarial assumptions should incorporate actual experience and investment
assumptions of expected long-term yield of plan assets.
(3) Annual required contribution (ARC) should include the cost of benefits accrued
by plan member employees in the current year (“normal cost”) plus an
amortized portion of any unfunded actuarial liability.
(4) An acceptable amortization period (originally up to 40 years but reduced to 30
years in 2006) should be consistent with generally accepted accounting
principles (GAAP). This amortization period is applied to both the plan’s ‘initial’
underfunding and any subsequent underfunding created by benefit increases
attributed to ‘past service.’
Under GASB 25 and 27 public pension plan sponsors must recognize and disclose the
following information in their financial statement: the fair value of plan assets; plan
liabilities; plan net assets and annual changes in net assets; required employer and
employee contributions; and historical information on the ratio of actual plan sponsor
contributions to the plan sponsor’s ARC. To summarize, the GASB 25/27 reporting
framework generates two types of information: (1) current financial information about
plan assets, and (2) financial activities and actuarial information that provide a longterm outlook on the plan’s funded status and the progress in accumulating assets to pay
obligations that become due (Peng, 2009; p321-322).
GASB Statement 34, issued in 1999 and widely implemented by FY 2003, further
defined the inclusion of public pension plans in the fiduciary fund group by requiring
states and local governments to prepare two sets of financial statements for their
respective pension plans (Peng, 2009):
(1) A plan’s current financial information appears in the Statement of Plan Net
Assets and Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets.
(2) The plan’s long-term actuarial position is reported in two required schedules
- the Schedule of Funding Progress and the Schedule of Employer
Contributions.
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Both sets of statements are prepared on a full accrual basis of accounting with a
measurement focus on economic resources; all inflow and outflow of resources are
recorded, as long as a monetary value can be attached to them. This means that all
transactions occurring in the year having a financial impact on a plan are reported
whether or not cash changes hands. This is different from governmental funds where
the modified accrual basis of accounting places the measurement focus on current
financial resources (Mead, 2000; as cited in Peng, 2009).

Actuarial Measures of Funded Status
Three measures are commonly used to evaluate the funded status of a DB plan
derived from the abovementioned actuarial schedules (GAO, 2008). The first measure is
the pension plan’s funding ratio of plan assets to liabilities; or more formally defined as
the ratio of actuarial value of assets (present value of accumulated plan assets) to
actuarial accrued liabilities (present value of accrued plan liabilities). It is the most
recognized measure of overall pension fund health or summary measure of funded
status - indicating the extent to which a plan has sufficient assets set aside to pay
accrued benefits (Mitchell et al., 2001, p. 25). The measure is also referred to as the
“stock” funding ratio because it gives a snapshot of the plan’s cumulative financial
health at a moment in time (Mitchell & Smith, 1994; Yang & Mitchell, 2005). A ratio of
one (or 100%) indicates that a pension plan is fully funded whereas a ratio less than one
(less than 100%) represent an underfunded status.15
The second measure is the relative size of a plan’s unfunded obligation for past
service or unfunded actuarial accrued liability (UAAL). It is derived from the difference
between the actuarial value of assets (AVA) and accrued actuarial liabilities (UAAL= AVA-

15

A funded ratio of at least 80 percent or more represents a commonly held normative view of
what constitutes a “healthy or responsible” funding level for a public pension plan (e.g. GAO,
2007, Pew Center, 2007). D’Arcy and Dulebohn (1999) develop a simulation model that
estimates plan-specific optimal funding levels for state retirement systems as determined by
several factors that include the level and growth in pension obligations, the state’s current and
future tax base and interest rates.
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AAL). The UAAL measure is commonly reported as a percentage of a plan’s annual
covered payroll to take into account the size of the pension plan (Peng, 2008).
A favorable funding ratio and UAAL measure represent the fundamental policy
objective of pension reform. Let us suppose a state DB pension plan records some level
of underfunding such that the funding ratio is less than 100 percent (AVA - AAL < 0). If
the state government responds by enacting pension reform policy, the favorable
funding outcome is manifested through an increase in the plan’s funding ratio and a
lowering of the unfunded liability measure.
The third actuarial measure is a pension plan’s flow funding ratio which measures
the retirement system’s ability to meet its annual required contribution; or in other
words, it reports the extent to which a plan sponsor is paying down unfunded
obligations and keeping up with benefits as they accrue. This measure first defined for
public pensions by Mitchell and Smith (1994) as the ratio of a plan’s employer’s actual
contribution (AC) by the plan’s annual required contribution (ARC) gives a “flow”
perspective on whether the plan sponsor is “setting aside enough money each year to
meet that year’s [funding] requirements (p. 280).”16 A flow funding ratio of less than
one (less than 100%) indicates that the actual employer contribution (AC) made by the
plan sponsor is less than the amount of their annual required contribution (ARC). In
determining how well governments are meeting their plan’s annual funding needs,
contributing the full ARC each year is key to maintaining a fully funded plan, or in the
case of an underfunded plan, necessary for getting the plan back on a path to long-term
solvency. In more specific terms, paying the full ARC signifies that the plan sponsor has
set aside sufficient funds to cover currently accruing benefits and the amortized portion
of any unfunded liability carried over from previous years (Munnell et al., 2008e).

16

The term “required” can be misleading because governments can choose to pay more or less
than the ARC (GAO, 2008).
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Linking Reforms to Key DB Funding Components
Having provided an overview of the relevant GASB guidelines and the major
actuarial valuation measures used in public pension accounting and financial reporting –
flow funding ratio, stock funding ratio, the UAAL (%ACP) – I proceed to show these three
measures, along with the employer contribution rate, serve as the key outcomes
evaluated in my study of state DB plan funding. I start by incorporating these measures
into an asset-liability framework that I use in describing the basic structure and process
in funding a typical state DB plan (see Figure 3-1).

Figure 3-1. Increase in Unfunded DB Plan Liabilities Due to Deficient Employer
Contributions (Note: AVA–Actuarial Value of Assets; AAL-Actuarial Accrued Liabilities;
AC-employer’s Actual Contribution; ARC-annual required contribution)

In summarizing the discussion from the previous chapter and extending it to this
chapter, the general policy objective of the various categories of public pension reforms
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is to improve state DB plan funding outcomes by accomplishing either increasing annual
plan revenues and/or reducing plan expenditures. Data constraints may prevent the
direct estimation of the actual impact of specific reforms, but each category of public
pension reforms can analytically be tied to a specific DB funding component.
Components of State DB Plan Funding
I use a simple asset-liability framework as illustrated in Figure 3-1 to identify the key
funding components of a typical state DB pension plan, and how each component is
associated with a category of pension reforms. Using a “balance-sheet like” approach in
describing the DB funding structure and process also provides the analytical framework
for hypothesizing on funding outcomes due to changes in a specific DB plan funding
component when addressed by a selected category of pension reforms.
Starting on the asset side, the three primary sources of annual pension plan
revenues for a state DB pension plan are investment returns, employer contributions,
and employee contributions. As noted in Chapter 2, investment returns represent the
largest and most important source of annual pension fund revenues, a point illustrated
in Figure 3-1, where Investment Returns is denoted with a much larger rectangular area
compared to Employee and Employer contributions. Given the substantial revenue
share from investment income, the overall funded status of public DB plans is tied
closely to plan investment performance, which in turn, is a function of the asset
allocation decisions made by the DB plan sponsor and the overall condition of the
capital markets. State governments that introduce or consider defined contribution or
hybrid plans for their new employees, do so as a way of transferring some if not all the
risk of investment loss, along with the contribution burden, from the plan sponsor to the
plan employee.
Despite all the consideration for introducing DC plans, DB pension plans will
continue to dominate in the public sector given the 90 percent of currently employed
public employees covered under DB retirement systems. As such, it is more likely that
the majority of reforms related to pension investment performance are geared towards
improving DB plan governance and investment oversight. The effectiveness of these
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reforms will be judged according to the degree they improve plan investment
performance given the conditions of the financial market and overall macroeconomic
environment.
The annual revenue derived from investment income may be stochastic in nature
but the level of employer and employee contributions, and the size of retirement
benefits, are much more deterministic. The latter two are mainly defined by statute
whereas the former depends on the plan sponsor’s contribution behavior. Going back to
Figure 3-1 as our illustration, the policy objective of reforms addressing any of the three
annual revenue sources is akin to increasing the size of actuarial asset values as
represented by the size of both rectangles denoting plan assets, At and At+1. One can
see then how the overall funded status of a DB pension plan, as indicated by its stock
funding ratio, is improved by implementing reforms related to increasing annual plan
revenues. By increasing plan revenues, the size of actuarial asset values increases
relative to plan liabilities, and ceteris paribus, this results in a higher stock funding ratio
and reduces the size of a plan’s unfunded liability.
I start defining the liability side of my framework by first considering that a defined
benefit retirement system guarantees the plan member a set level of pension benefits
calculated from an actuarial formula that includes the years of service, the employee’s
final average salary, and some pre-determined retirement multiplier (Hustead, 2001).17
From the plan sponsor’s perspective, the annual benefits paid out to plan retirees,
usually through life annuities, represent the plan’s primary cash outflow or expense in
the current period. In FY 2010, retirement benefit payments comprised 94 percent of all
public pension plan expenditures (Becker-Medina, 2012). As illustrated by the
rectangular areas Lt and Lt+1. in Figure 3-1, the total actuarial value of liabilities in
current year t includes not only the benefit payments made to current retirees but the
17

DB plan commonly employ the final average method in which the pension paid is derived
from the average of the final 3 to 5 years of employment. A survey study by Brainard (2007)
found that the median FAS retirement multiplier rate for DB public pension plans with and
without Social Security coverage was 1.9% and 2.2% respectively. Approximately a fourth of
public employees do not participate in Social Security, including 40 percent of public school
teachers and a majority of public safety personnel (Brainard, 2011).
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benefits accrued from past, current, and expected future service of active employees as
well. When applied to Figure 3-1, reforms that attempt to reduce the cost of retirement
benefits is analytically equivalent to reducing the area of rectangles Lt and Lt+1. By
extension, just as it was on the asset side, reforms that attempt to reduce the size of a
plan’s total retirement benefit payments translates into lowering the actuarial value of
plan liabilities, which holding plan assets constant, likewise results in a higher stock
funding.
However, as often is the case with theory and application, the actual effectiveness of
the various public pension reforms is difficult to gauge given the lack of data at this
point. Still, if we consider the relatively fixed and smaller annual revenue share of
employee contributions compared to investment income, addressing the former will
likely be a less effective policy reform option. The effectiveness of improved funding
outcomes from reforms related to reducing benefits are also questionable given their
strong legal protections that makes it less likely that states will be able to apply these
kind of policies beyond new hires. This then leaves us with the category of reforms that
address how the plan sponsor fulfills its annual contribution requirements. To highlight
the critical function that employer contributions play in DB pension plan funding
outcomes, I describe the most common case characterizing DB public pension plans –
that of being underfunded.

Applying the Framework to a Two-Period Model of Underfunding
We can use the asset-liability framework illustrated in Figure 3-1 to derive a general
hypothesis of retirement system underfunding that relates employer contribution
behavior with the overall funded status of a DB public pension plan. Specifically, I show
how a failure by the plan sponsor to fully meet its annual employer contributions leads
to further deterioration in funding outcomes. Let us assume a single investment horizon
from year t to year t+1 for an underfunded state DB plan; that is, AVA<AAL and the plan
incurs an unfunded liability (UAAL), where t denotes the year in which assets are
invested with an interest income earned beginning year t+1, and so on. The investment
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income combined with employee and employer contributions constitutes the total
pension revenue for the current period.
Now, if the state pays the full ARC for year t, t+1, and so on, then a portion of the
UAAL is paid off each year as part of a series of deficiency payments over a specified
amortization period. Paying the full ARC demonstrates that the state has allocated
sufficient assets to cover currently accruing benefits along with a portion of any
unfunded liability carried over from year t-p periods. If the state fails to pay its full ARC
in year t, a contribution shortfall occurs and gets carried over to the next period; hence,
increasing the plan’s net pension obligation. Thus, a high ARC value may imply that the
cost of benefits are relatively high or signal the cumulative negligence of the plan
sponsor in making its annual employer contribution commitment.
Holding investment returns constant and ceteris paribus, the state will now have to
allocate additional funds on top of its annual contribution. In order for the UAAL to be
amortized on schedule along with the interest incurred on any net pension obligation,
the employer contribution rate will need to increase in subsequent years starting from
year t+1. If we extend this asset-liability framework to account for multiple periods, the
plan’s unfunded liability will likely grow over time if the plan sponsor continues to fail in
meeting its full actuarial funding requirement.
An applied test of this framework will allow us to evaluate two empirical questions
on the employer contribution behavior of state DB plans. The first is related to how well
states have met their annual employer contribution requirements. The second is related
to testing the hypothesis that employer contribution behavior is positively related to the
overall funded status of state DB plans. Answering both questions might yield new
insights into the fiduciary role of state governments as DB plan sponsors.

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I outlined a simple asset liability framework that incorporated
relevant financial and actuarial concepts to describe the funding structure and process,
and evaluate funding outcomes of a typical state DB pension plan. Four key funding
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components were identified. The first three components make up the asset side, with
investment income and contributions from member employees and the plan sponsor as
primary sources of annual plan revenues, whereas the fourth funding component on the
liability side is comprised mainly of retirement benefit payments.
This “balance-sheet like” approach to describing the state DB funding structure and
process also provides the analytical framework by which to link the various categories of
pension reforms with a specific funding component. From here, I derived hypotheses on
the outcomes from changes in the funding components affected by selected categories
of pension reforms. I showed how the funded status of state DB plans, as indicated by
the stock funding ratio and the relative size of unfunded liabilities, is positively related
to increases in the employee and employer contribution rate and reductions in
retirement benefit payments. Lastly, I applied this framework to model the impact of
employer contributions on the overall funded status of a DB plan. I showed how the
overall funded status of a plan can deteriorate over time if the DB plan sponsor, in this
case, the state government, fails to make the full ARC payment each year. In the next
chapter, I present the empirical methods for testing these hypothesized DB plan funding
relationships.

Copyright © Cezar Brian Mamaril 2013
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CHAPTER 4
RESEARCH METHODS

In the previous chapter, I presented a simple asset-liability framework for describing
the structure and process of state DB retirement system funding with key components
and outcomes identified. The framework was used to develop the study’s hypotheses
for relating the effect of increasing employer and employee contributions and reducing
benefits on key DB plan funding outcomes. In this chapter, my empirical analysis for
testing these hypothesized funding relationships is divided into two parts. The first part
takes into consideration the fiduciary responsibility of states in ensuring the solvency of
their respective retirement systems. How well the state government fulfills this
responsibility is reflected by its actual employer contributions relative to the annual
required contributions (ARC) as determined by system actuaries. I present an empirical
model that evaluates the determinants of employer contribution rates and flow funding
ratios, and test the hypothesis that states have underfunded their annual employer
contributions. The second part of my analysis draws from my analytical framework that
considers the three general categories of pension reform efforts related to key DB
funding components, specifically, increases in employer and employee contributions
and reductions in retiree benefits. I discuss my empirical model for testing the
hypothesized relationship between these funding components and the funded status of
a plan as indicated by the stock funding ratio and size of unfunded actuarial accrued
liabilities.
In the last part of this chapter, I describe the construction of my panel dataset and
sample of state DB pension plans. I provide an overview of the panel regression
methods, present summary statistics, and discuss general trends in my models’
dependent and explanatory variables of interest.
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Empirical Model
In this study, I examine four funding outcomes of state DB retirement systems: (1)
the employer contribution rate, (2) the flow funding ratio, (3) the stock funding ratio,
and (4) the size of a plan’s unfunded actuarial liabilities. For each outcome, I specify a
panel regression model that takes the general form:
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝒌𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑪𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜆𝑇𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(eq. 4-1)

Where i=1,2,…,100 refers to each of the 100 state pension plans in my panel
dataset; t=2002,2003,…,2010 denotes the time period in years covered in my analysis,
resulting in a panel with dimensions N x T, where N=100 and T=9; ki,t is the matrix of
explanatory variables observed for plan i in year t; Ci,t contain the control variables
comprised of selected plan-level characteristics and state fiscal measures respectively;
and fundingi,t is the DB state funding outcome or the dependent variable of the
specified model.
The term i + i,t represents the composite error μi,t, where i,t is an independently
distributed error term with E[i,t]=0 for all i and t, and refers to all the unobserved
factors affecting plan funding outcomes that change across time as well as across plans;

i captures all unobserved time-invariant factors that affect a plan’s funding outcome.
Since i denotes a unique pension plan, we also call i the plan fixed effect. Finally, Tt is a
vector of year dummy variables to capture year effects common to all state DB plans. In
other words, my models control for any unmeasured universal time-related shocks or
national factors that may have influenced all state DB plans over the study period.
I direct the first half of my empirical analysis on the determinants of state DB
pension employer funding behavior. To test the hypothesis that states have
underfunded their annual employer contributions, a panel regression model of
employer contribution rates (Model 1, see eq.4-2) and a model of flow funding ratios
(Model 2) are specified in eq. 4-2 and eq. 4-3 respectively:
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Model 1: the dependent variable is the employer’s actual contribution rate (ac_acpi,t),
expressed as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered payroll

ac_acpi,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (stocki,t)
+ β4 (arc_acpi,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t

(eq. 4-2)

Model 2: the dependent variable is the plan’s flow funding ratio (flowi,t)

flowi,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (stocki,t)
+ β4 (arc_acpi,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t

(eq. 4-3)

where memcon_acpi,t is the employee contribution rate expressed as a percentage of
the annual covered payroll; lnavebeni,t is the logarithm of a plan’s average benefit
payment; stocki,t is the plan’s stock funding ratio and arc_acpi,t is the annual required
contribution rate expressed as a percentage of annual covered payroll. For this part of
the empirical analysis, we are interested in evaluating the estimated coefficient result
for arc_acpi,t to see if there is evidence for our hypothesis that states have underfunded
their employer contributions.
In the second part of my analysis, I specify another two panel regression models (see
eq. 4-4 and eq. 4-5) to examine the relationship between the key funding components
of a DB state plan and its overall funded status as indicated by the stock funding ratio
(Model 3) and unfunded actuarial accrued liabilities (Model 4):
Model 3: - the dependent variable is the plan’s stock funding ratio (stocki,t)

stocki,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (ac_acpi,t)
+ β4 (made_arci,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t

(eq. 4-4)

Model 4: the dependent variable is the relative size of a plan’s unfunded actuarial
accrued liability (uaal_acpi,t), expressed as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered
payroll

uaal_acpi,t = β0 + β1 (memcon_acpi,t) + β2 (lnavebeni,t) + β3 (ac_acpi,t)
+ β4 (made_arci,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t

(eq. 4-5)

Where ac_acpi,t is the employer contribution rate; and made_arci,t is a dummy
variable to indicate whether the plan made its full annual required contribution;
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memcon_acpi,t and lnavebeni,t are the same explanatory variables used in Models 1 and
2. Additionally, all four empirical models use the same set of control variables Ci,t
comprised of selected plan-level characteristics and state fiscal measures, respectively.
These include actreti,t, a control for plan member composition between active and
retired plan members; assumedreti,t the selected discount rate used in the actuarial
asset valuation; and historicalreti,t the one year actual rate of return on investments.
Here, the empirical strategy builds on the proposition derived from my analytical
framework that we can evaluate the funding of certain categories of pension reforms by
first associating each type of reform with a specific DB funding component. Through this
approach, I test the hypotheses that reforms related to increasing employee and
employer contributions positively affect state DB plan stock funding ratios and reduce
plan unfunded liabilities, and that the same effect, is expected from reforms that reduce
the size of retirement benefit payments.
Dependent Variables
In this section, I review the empirical literature behind the dependent variables
specified in my panel regression models; where each of the four dependent variables
represents a key DB funding outcome as described in Chapter 3.
Employer Contribution Rate and Flow Funding Ratio
Model 1 is used to analyze the determinants of employer contribution behavior. The
dependent variable is the plan sponsor’s annual actual employer contribution rate,
expressed as a percentage of the plan’s payroll. To obtain this variable, I first collect
data on the total employer contribution amount made for each state DB plan as
indicated in the CAFR Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets section. I then divide this
amount by the plan’s annual covered payroll to scale it according to plan size and
standardize it according to the ARC measure as defined under GASB 25.
The public pension funding study by Mitchell and Smith (1994), who analyzed crosssectional 1989 data on per-worker actual and required employer contributions of 42
public pension plans from 31 states, is the only known empirical evaluation which
directly looks at the determinants of actual employer contributions. Mitchell and Smith
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(1994) hypothesized that actual employer contributions are characterized by either
behavioral persistence or regression-to-the-mean funding behavior. The former implies
that past long-term funding behavior produces a positive unitary relationship with flow
funding. The latter predicts periods of underfunding and overfunding follow each other,
resulting in an offsetting or non-significant relationship between stock funding and
employer contribution efforts. They also found that while stock funding positively
affects current employer funding, it is not a unitary relationship. They suggested that
employer funding in public pension plans exhibit some form of behavioral persistence
attenuated by a regression-to-the-mean funding behavior.
Young (2008) provides a more recent discussion of PERS employer contribution rates
as defined in this study. Employer contribution rate volatility is traced to the failure of
governments to make the necessary annual required contributions; unfunded and adhoc retirement benefit increases; and the pursuit of higher risk and higher return asset
allocation strategies. 18 Young (2008) goes on to discuss examples of strategies and
practices carried out to mitigate rate fluctuations. These include spreading or smoothing
asset gains and losses over longer periods; requiring minimum contribution rates; and
restricting rate changes. Nevertheless, Young (2008) argues that despite efforts to limit
employer contribution rate volatility, “as long as investments by public retirement
systems continue to emphasize higher-risk, equity asset classes, some volatility will
remain” (p. 83).
As employer contributions make up one of three major sources of annual pension
fund revenues, the employer contribution rate is specified in Models 3 and 4 as an
explanatory variable of stock funding and unfunded plan liabilities, respectively. On the
surface, greater employer contributions should translate into higher funding levels. This
positive relationship was posited by Doyle (2005) who used a pooled five-year crosssectional dataset of SLG pension plans but found instead that an increase in the

18

Young (2008) gives examples of governments who instituted contribution holidays during
periods of above-average investment returns.
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employer contribution rate was associated with a lower stock funding ratio.19 Although
Doyle (2005) fails to discuss their result, it suggests that the funding relationship
between the employer contribution rate and stock is more of an endogenous process in
which the plan sponsor contributes more in order to cover any funding shortfall as
indicated by a lower stock funding ratio.
Building on the first dependent variable, the flow funding ratio is the second
dependent variable analyzed. As defined in the Chapter 3, it is simply the ratio of a
plan’s actual employer’s actual contribution (AC) to its annual required employer
contribution (ARC). To obtain this measure, I first get my ARC data from the state or plan
CAFR Required Schedule of Employer Contributions section, which will often include
information as well on the actual employer contribution and/or the flow funding ratio or
percentage contributed as required under GASB 25 (Peng 2008). This “flow” pension
funding measure was first defined in Mitchell and Smith (1994), and Mitchell and Hsin
(1997) were the first to empirically examine its determinants. The authors used a crosssectional survey of 269 SLG pension plans from 1991 and specified a model of flow
funding with explanatory variables covering five categories: pension board composition,
board management practices, investment practices, reporting requirements, and
assumptions. Their results showed that only board member liability insurance coverage
and board authorized actuarial assumptions were found to significantly affect the flow
funding ratio.
In their review of the empirical pension funding literature, Yang and Mitchell (2005)
noted that most of the studies analyzed cross-sectional data using single equation
19

The dataset used by Doyle (2005) to evaluate stock funding is commonly referred to as the
“PENDAT” files, made up of a series of periodic surveys conducted by the Public Pension
Coordinating Council (PPCC) to determine the funded status of SLG pension plans from the
following years: 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998 and 2000 (Harris, 2002). When pooled, the
PENDAT files formed an unbalanced panel dataset that ranged from a sample of 124 plans
surveyed in FY 1990 to as many as 228 plans surveyed in FY 1996. Doyle’s PENDAT sample
consisted of the following fiscal years (1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, and 2000). The Public Pension
Coordinating Council was a confederation of three national associations serving state and local
government retirement plans: The National Association of State Retirement Administrators
(NASRA), The National Conference on Public Employee Retirement Systems (NCPERS), and The
National Council on Teacher Retirement (NCTR).
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models. They argued that prior studies failed to account for endogeneity of plan funding
and investment performance such that funding results in one year may be related to
lagged funding measures. According to Yang and Mitchell (2005), they address these
econometric issues by running pooled OLS on seven years of PENDAT survey results
using the same flow funding and stock funding model from Mitchell and Hsin (1997).20
Yang and Mitchell (2005) found that a one percentage point increase in the stock
funding ratio was associated with a 0.45 percentage point increase in the flow funding
ratio. They suggested that the positive but less-than unitary relationship between stock
and flow funding lends support to Mitchell and Smith’s (1994) conclusion that public
pension funding persistence is attenuated by mean reversion effects. Yang and Mitchell
also found a positive relationship between flow funding plans that assumed a longer
amortization period for accrued liabilities; and plans having more retirees as board
members, and states having a dedicated tax for financing pension contributions, have a
negative effect on flow funding.
Using the same PENDAT dataset, Eaton and Nofsinger (2004), as part of their
analysis of flow funding ratios, proposed an adjusted flow funding measure that
standardized the required employer contributions to account for differences in the
actuarial asset valuation assumptions used by the public pension plans in their sample.21
In comparing their adjusted flow funding measure to the regular unadjusted flow
funding measure along with the rest of their analysis, they found evidence that actuarial
assumptions, particularly the salary growth rate and discount rate, were manipulated
for plans in states experiencing high political pressure and fiscal stress.

20

Yang and Mitchell (2005) use the same PENDAT files as Doyle (2005), but add two more years
of survey results from 1990 and 1991.
21
Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) assume an equivalent salary growth rate (5.99%) and discount
rate (7.86%) to standardize required contribution levels. From an ex-post perspective, their
rationale is valid since their pooled cross-sectional sample covered fiscal years 1990 to 1996, a
period prior to the implementation of GASB 25 and 27 that standardized public pension
accounting and reporting (Steffen, 2001). Since the data I use are from subsequent periods
wherein CAFRs are prepared according to these GASB standards, I assume the ARC values in my
flow funding ratios are sufficient and valid for comparing across plans.
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My flow-funding ratio is also specified as an explanatory variable in Models 3 and 4,
but instead of using the ratio measure as is, I specify a dummy variable indicating if the
plan employer paid at least 100 percent of its ARC for that given year. The model
predicts higher stock funding ratios and less unfunded liabilities for plans that make the
full ARC payment compared to plans that fail to pay their full ARC. The hypothesis
draws from my analytical framework in Chapter 3 where I directly relate a plan’s overall
funded status to the degree by which the public plan sponsor is making its ARC
payments. For this particular dummy variable indicator of flow-funding dummy, its
determinants were examined by Munnell et al. (2008d, 2011c) for two separate fiscal
years (FY 2006 and 2008) using cross-sectional data on 126 SLG plans from the NASRA
and NCTR Public Funds Survey (PFS) and Public Plans Database at the Center for
Retirement Research at Boston College (CRC).22 Both studies, using similarly specified
probit regression models, found that a higher state debt to GSP ratio, and the use of
projected-unit-cost (PUC) actuarial valuation method, made it less likely for a plan
sponsor to make 100 percent of its ARC payment. Having a large public pension plan, a
larger proportion of active to retired employees on the pension board, and Social
Security coverage for plan members, were the other factors associated with a lower
likelihood of a full ARC payment being made.
Stock Funding Ratio and UAAL as a % of ACP
By definition, since UAAL=AVA-AAL, the plan’s stock funding ratio (Model 3
dependent variable), computed as the ratio of a plan’s actuarial value of assets (AVA) to
its accrued actuarial liabilities (AAL), is used to derive the dependent variable for Model
4, the size of a plan’s unfunded liabilities, expressed as a percentage of its annual

22

For FY 2006 as analyzed in Munell et al. (2008d), data came from the Public Funds Survey is
sponsored by the National Association of State Retirement Administrators and the National
Council on Teacher Retirement. The database is maintained by Keith Brainard, NASRA Research
Director, and accessed from http://www.publicfundsurvey.org. It is more or less an offshoot of
the PPCC PENDAT files that covered public pension funding from 1990 to 2002. For FY 2008 as
analyzed in Munnell et al. (2011c), data came from the Public Plans Database, which is produced
and maintained by the Center for Retirement Research at Boston College, and whose director is
Alicia H. Munnell. The database, available at http://crr.bc.edu/data/public-plans-database/, is
co-sponsored by the Center for State and Local Government Excellence (CSLGE).

44

covered payroll (uaal_acp). Data for all variables comes from the state or plan CAFR
Required Schedule of Funding Progress section.
A review of the pension funding literature shows that apart from the pension fund
performance and governance, the stock funding ratio is the most commonly evaluated
pension funding measure (Schneider, 2005). Just as it was with studies that examined
flow funding ratios, the majority of studies that examined stock funding ratios were
based on estimating cross-sectional data with single equation models (Yang & Mitchell,
2005). Recent examples in the literature include Munnell et al. (2011c, 2008d) who
analyze stock funding ratio data from 126 plans for fiscal years 2006 and 2008
separately.23 Both studies showed that lower stock funding was associated with plans
using the PUC actuarial valuation method and when teachers were included in the plan.
Conversely, larger plans and plans having a separate investment council positively
influenced stock funding ratios. The former result is interesting because it complements
my hypothesis on the relationship between stock and flow funding. As Munnell (2011c,
2008a) reported, larger plans having more assets were associated with lower flow
funding ratios. When considered altogether, the results suggest that that plans having
more assets, holding all else constant, translates into a higher stock funding ratio, and in
turn, results in a lower required employer contribution rate. However, the plan sponsor
ends up contributing even less because it assumes continuing favorable investment
returns in the future.
Results from several longitudinal pension funding studies have provided insight on
the temporal aspects of various stock funding determinants. In relating those results to
the explanatory variables specified in my own empirical model of stock funding, the
literature provides evidence of the significant influence of the following determinants:
plan member composition (Giertz & Papke, 2007, Eaton & Nofsinger, 2008); investment
rate of return (Yang & Mitchell, 2005); discount rate (Doyle, 2005), and various fiscal

23

The two studies utilized the same set of pension funding data used in analyzing flow funding
ratios analyzed in Munnell et al (2011c and 2008a).
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indicators such as the per capita tax revenue (Giertz & Papke, 2007), the ratio of interest
paid to revenue (Eaton & Nofsinger, 2008), and debt to GDP income ratio (Doyle 2005).
Following Mitchell and Smith’s (1994) behavioral persistence hypothesis of pension
funding that relates a plan’s cumulative financial health with current funding efforts, I
use the stock funding ratio as an explanatory variable in Models 1 and 2 in determining
both the actual employer contribution rate and flow funding ratio. Based on this
hypothesis, we would expect stock funding to positively influence both indicators of
public pension plan employer contribution behavior. 24
My fourth and last dependent variable is the unfunded actuarial accrued liability,
expressed as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered payroll (uaal_acp). When we
consider that this indicator has been available in state and plan CAFRs since 1997 as part
of GASB 25, it is surprising to find that an empirical assessment of this unfunded liability
measure is lacking in the literature. To date, the only econometric study that focuses
solely on the determinants of unfunded pension liability is that by Coggburn and
Kearney (2010) who examined the per capita unfunded pension liability at the state
level of both regular pension and other post-employment benefits (OPEBs). Using crosssectional data from the Pew Center on the unfunded pension liability of all 50 states for
FY 2007, the authors found a positive relationship between a state’s per capita
unfunded pension liability with the employer contribution rate, public employee density
per 10,000 population, state per capita personal income, and the ratio of state interest
payments to total revenue. A novel contribution of the study was to examine the
managerial influence of state administrators on state pension unfunded liability. Using
indicators from the Governance Performance Project, Coggburn and Kearney’s (2010)
analysis suggested that states with better financial management capacity and human
resource management were associated with lower unfunded pension liabilities.25

24

See Mitchell and Hsin (1997), Mitchell and Smith (1994), and Yang and Mitchell (2005)
Barrett, K. and Greene, R. 2005. “Grading the States ’05: The Year of Living Dangerously.”
Governing, 18(5): 24–95, as cited in Coggburn and Kearney (2010).
25
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Explanatory Variables
The explanatory variables in my panel regression models are drawn directly from the
asset-liability framework in Chapter 3. Each of the variables is hypothesized to directly
affect the DB public pension funding outcomes, they are specified as follows: the plan’s
employee contribution rate reported as a percentage of the plan’s annual payroll; the
logarithm of average plan benefit payments; and the one-year rate of return on
investments. I also include as additional predictors, the plan’s stock funding ratio and
annual required contribution rate for my pension funding model of employer
contribution rates (Model 1) and flow funding (Model 2).
Employee Contribution Rate
In theory, if we were to hold the number of active plan members constant, increases
in the employee contribution rate (memcon_acp) increases the amount of revenue
inflows and would thus be expected to have a positive effect on a plan’s overall funded
status. Alternatively, if we take the perspective that the plan sponsor increases the
member contributions to reduce the ARC, then the effect of increasing the employee
contribution rates is to shift the more of the pension cost burden from the employer to
plan members (GAO 2012a).
State DB plan employee members normally contribute a statutorily set percentage
of their annual wage. Most state plans administer multi-tiered employee contribution
rates, where new plan members are required to contribute at a higher rate than older
members do. Because it requires access to relevant member and rate information, an
ideal but less feasible approach would be to compute the plan’s average employee
contribution rate. For the purpose of this study, I use the aggregate plan employee
contributions as reported in the CAFR Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets and
express it as a percentage of the plan’s annual covered payroll.
LOG average annual plan benefit payment
Under GASB 25, total annual plan benefit payments is recorded as part of the
‘Deductions’ in the Statement of Changes in Plan Net Assets in either the state CAFR
section for pension trust funds or the CAFR of the pension plan itself (Peng, 2009). I use
this data and divide it by the number of retired plan members and then derive the
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logarithm of the average annual plan benefit payment, labeled lnaveben, to obtain this
variable. Holding the number of retirees and beneficiaries constant, reducing retirement
benefits reduces the amount of pension liabilities thus resulting in a lower lnaveben.
Lowering the value of lnaveben in turn is expected to produce favorable funding
outcomes as indicated by higher plan funding ratios and fewer unfunded pension
liabilities.
One-year rate of return on investment and Annual Required Contribution Rate
As investment income comprises the largest proportion of annual public pension
plan revenues, the one-year rate of return on investments variable, historicalret, is
expected to have a significant impact on both employer contribution behavior and the
overall funded status. However, the degree to which a higher investment rate of return
increases a plan’s stock funding ratio, and reduces its unfunded liability, may be
attenuated by the actuarial smoothing assumptions applied in valuing plan asset
investments. On the surface, higher investment income means that the plan’s asset
holdings increased relative to its liabilities, and as a consequence, the plan sponsor’s
required contribution rate (ARC) is expected to be lower as well ceteris paribus. With a
lower ARC, holding all other things constant, the plan sponsor should be in a better
position to fully meet its current employer contributions, resulting in a higher flow
funding ratio. But what happens in practice as widely cited anecdotally in the literature,
is that the plan sponsor tends to shirk on its annual funding obligations as it develops
optimistic expectations of an upward or favorable trend in investment returns moving
forward. Thus, it would not be unexpected to find an inverse relationship between
historicalret and ac_acp, and also between historicalret and flow.
For econometric modeling purposes, an explanatory variable category for plan level
actuarial assumptions is invariably specified in the empirical pension funding literature.
The specified variables from this category range from the actuarial costing method to
the length of the amortization period. All these assumptions are used in valuing plan
assets and liabilities, and ultimately determine the plan’s ARC. As earlier defined, the
ARC is the actuarially determined amount that the plan sponsor needs to pay in order to
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cover current year benefits accrued (normal cost) and an amortization of any UAAL.
Therefore, instead of including all these different actuarial assumptions in my panel
regression models, I assume that the ARC is a better explanatory variable because it
incorporates already, all the relevant actuarial assumptions. Holding everything else
constant, my model predicts a positive relationship between ARC and AC, and an inverse
relationship between ARC and the flow funding ratio. The size of the estimated
coefficient for the ARC variable will be of major interest because the difference from
ideal unitary relationship between ARC and AC determines the degree by which the plan
sponsor is underfunding its employer contributions.
Other Plan-Level Control Variables
Plan level controls in all models include a control for plan size in terms of
membership and current level of total assets at market price. I use the ratio of active
members to plan retirees and their beneficiaries for the former and the logarithm of
total plan assets in the latter.
In studying the impact of gender differences on public pension funding levels, Eaton
and Nofsinger (2008) found that plans with a higher ratio of retirees to active members
were more underfunded. Although Eaton and Nofsinger (2008) do not explain this
finding, it could be that the result is due to a larger outflow of benefit payments (plan
liabilities) when the proportion of retirees increase. Vice versa, I expect a mirror result
with positive funding outcomes associated with plans having a greater proportion of
active members to retirees due to higher revenue inflows from member contributions
relative to retirement benefit payments.
In controlling for plan size according to asset holdings, larger plans are expected to
have better funding outcomes; with more assets, plans have a greater capacity to better
handle annual revenue changes if investment returns become volatile. Using the same
longitudinal dataset on public pension funding compiled from seven years of PENDAT
surveys, Yang and Mitchell (2005) and Listokin (2006) found contrasting results on the
relationship between stock funding and asset size (as expressed in logarithm terms).
While the former finds no statistically significant association, the latter shows that plan
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assets lagged one period earlier has a positive effect on current stock funding. Neither
study discusses their result for this variable, but the results might suggest that for this
sample of surveyed SLG pension plans from the 1990s, current year actuarial valuations
more fully incorporated past market values, rather than the current market value, of
total plan assets.
A variation on using plan asset size as a control variable in analyzing pension funding
levels was used by Munnell et al. (2008c, 2008d, 2011c). In their separate cross-section
regression analyses of 2006 and 2008 fiscal year funding data of public pension plans, an
indicator variable was used to denote plans as being a “large plan” if they belonged in
the top third of their sample in terms of assets. Munnell and colleagues found that
“large plans” were positively related to the stock funding ratio but less likely to pay the
full ARC.
To capture the actuarial nature of the dependent variables in all four empirical
models, I include another key parameter used in calculating asset values - the
assumption made by actuaries about expected plan investment returns. The assumed
rate of return variable is the rate used for discounting the current and future streams of
revenues and benefits earned to determine the present value of all assets and liabilities.
In a time value of money context, a higher discount rate lowers the present value of
liabilities and unfunded liabilities and results in a lower annual required contribution
needed to amortize those same liabilities.26 As highlighted in the studies of Novy-Marx
and Rauh (2009, 2011a, 2011b), the debate over the appropriate discount rate in
valuing pension liabilities is related to the various actuarial assumptions that public
retirement systems incorporate in their respective plan valuations. In one of the first
studies to evaluate the discount rates used by state retirement systems, Chaney et al.

26

In practice, plan actuaries calculate the discount rate based on the expected price inflation
and the real rate of return. In a recent example provided by a March 14, 2012 CalPERS Press
Release (see http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/press/pr-2012/mar/discountrate.xml), the CalPERS Actuarial Office recommended that the CalPERS discount rate of 7.75% be
adjusted to 7.25%. They derived this value by adding the current real return of 4.75% to a lower
price inflation assumption (from 3 to 2.75%). The press release also highlighted how the lower
discount rate affects plan employer contributions and the value of member benefits.
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(2002) analyzed state level pension funding data for 44 states from FY 1994 and FY 1995
and found that fiscally stressed states with balanced budget requirements strategically
selected higher discount rates. In a subsequent study, Eaton and Nofsinger (2004)
uncover a similar result at the individual pension plan level. Using five years of PENDAT
surveys, they hypothesized that a combination of fiscal and political factors spur public
plan sponsors to manipulate actuarial assumptions in order to appear better funded.
More specifically, Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) showed states assumed a higher rate of
return on plan assets when experiencing more fiscal stress (as indicated by increases in
the ratio of interest payments to revenue and public debt to revenue). Also using five
years of PENDAT surveys, a pooled OLS analysis by Doyle (2005) found the discount rate
was negatively associated with stock funding ratio. Doyle’s hypothesis on the inverse
relationship between the discount rate and stock funding was that a higher discount
rate presumes the plan actuaries are expecting greater returns from the financial
markets, thus lowering the contribution levels required of the plan sponsor. Following
the literature then, I expect to find the assumed rate of return is inversely related to
employer contribution efforts but positively related to overall plan funded levels.
Several studies have shown a significant relationship between state fiscal condition
and public pension funding levels. I follow Chaney et al. (2002) who uses the annual
year-ended unreserved General Fund balance (gfbal_urpc1k) as scaled by the state’s
population. In their study, Chaney et al. (2002) explain that gfbal_urpc1k, being a
cumulative measure, is an appropriate indicator of long-run state fiscal condition. They
also point out the importance of the general fund as being, “…the fund in which most
state tax revenue is recognized and from which most current spending is financed” (p.
296). While some have questioned using general fund data to measure state financial
condition (e.g., Wang et al., 2007), the clear link between the general fund and public
pension funding is established by Peng (2004, 2008):
“For state and local governments, most of the pension contributions going into the
pension trust fund originally come out of the general fund, which is the government’s
main operating fund…When viewed in this broader context, public pension funding is no
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longer an isolated pension financing issue, but rather part of the overall resource
allocation decision in the public sector” (Peng 2008, p. 142).
The above statement about the relationship between public budgeting and public
pension financial management draws from the fiscal stress theory of public pension plan
underfunding. Past studies examining the impact of various state fiscal indicators on
public pension funding found that states experiencing some form of fiscal stress or
unfavorable economic condition tend to have underfunded pension plans. 27 This theory
of public pension funding behavior maintains that during periods of fiscal or economic
stress or in the presence of statutory budget constraints (e.g., balanced budget
requirements), governments will tend to underfund their pension plans by reducing
employer contributions to free up funds for other budgetary items of greater priority or
urgent financial need (Peng, 2004). Assuming this supposition holds, I expect better
funding outcomes for DB plans in states having larger unreserved general fund balances.

Estimation Strategy
The standard approach to econometric modeling of panel data usually applies two
principal approaches, namely, fixed effects (FE) and random effects (RE) estimators. If
the unobserved time-invariant DB plan effects are uncorrelated with all the observed
explanatory variables, then using the RE estimator is the appropriate method
(Wooldridge, 2008). However, plan level characteristics vary greatly across DB state
retirement systems in all aspects of plan funding that range from membership coverage,
board composition, to the actuarial valuation methods used. Consequently, omitted
variable bias is a concern when we fail to include any of these characteristics in our

27

Some of the fiscal stress indicators examined include the following: the unemployment rate
(Schneider & Damanpour, 2002); state debt/income ratio (Munnell et al., 2008c); state debt
ratings (Listokin, 2006); ratio of state’s annual interest payments to total state revenue (Eaton &
Nofsinger, 2004; Coggburn & Kearney, 2010); and the presence of balanced budget
requirements (Chaney et al., 2002). While I included these alternative measures in my
preliminary model specifications, I selected the general fund balance as my primary state fiscal
indicator since it would most directly relate to the employer contribution behavior and relevant
DB plan funding outcomes in my study as described in my asset-liability framework.
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regression models that are correlated with our included explanatory funding variables.
To control for the possibility that unobserved time-invariant plan specific characteristics
systematically affect plan funding outcomes, I estimate my model using a fixed effects
approach to estimating my regression models. I also include year dummies to control
any unmeasured national factors or universal time shocks that affected all the plans in
my sample.

Description of the Dataset
My analysis utilizes a sample of 100 state administered DB pension plans from 50
states over a nine-year period covering fiscal years 2002 to 2010. This unique panel data
set pulls together information obtained from government reports consisting of
comprehensive annual financial reports (CAFRs) from both the state government and
whenever available, from the state retirement system itself. The information on state
pension trust funds found in the CAFRs is prepared according to GASB 25, 27, and 34
reporting guidelines, thus ensuring a level of standardization that allows us to compare
pension funding indicators across state retirement systems.
Other sources of data include the US Census Bureau State and Local Government
Employee Retirement Systems Survey (SLGERS) and the U.S. Bureau of Economic
Analysis. Due to data collection costs and constraints, my sample is limited to plans
covering general state employees and teachers, which typically represent the largest
retirement plans administered at the state level. Asset holdings in FY 2010 for the plans
in my sample was an estimated $2.1 trillion, which represents over 90 percent of total
assets held by all state administered plans for that fiscal year.
Table 4-1 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables included in the study’s
empirical models for my entire panel consisting of 100 individual state pension plans
covering nine fiscal years from 2002 to 2010. A cursory glance of the panel mean for
flow and stock funding ratios and comparing actual and required employer contribution
rates suggests underfunding in general - with the plans in my sample making 91 percent
of annual required employer contributions (flow funding), and setting aside assets that
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cover 82 percent of their total actuarial liabilities (stock funding). Underfunding at the
plan sponsor level is also immediately apparent as the panel mean for the actual
employer contribution rate (AC), 10.16 percent, is less than that of the annual required
contribution rate (ARC) of 12.03 percent. As shown in Table 4.1, scaling by the annual
covered payroll allows us to show the limited share and variability of employee
contributions relative to employer contributions and total unfunded actuarial liabilities.
Also notable from Table 4-1 is the 5.27 average rate of return on investments recorded
by the plans in my sample over the panel’s nine-year period, which is less than the panel
mean for the assumed rate of return of 8 percent. It is this gap between the assumed
and actual investment rate of return that represents the source of debate between
economists and public retirement system administrators over the appropriate discount
rate in valuing public pension plan assets.
I use line graphs in Figures 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 to show how the primary pension
funding outcomes and selected plan level variables relate to each other over time. By
definition, the inverse relationship between the stock funding ratio and unfunded
liability is shown in Figure 4-1. The considerable rise in unfunded pension obligations is
evident in the graph were the size of unfunded pension liabilities in FY 2010 was an
estimated 197 percent larger than it was in FY 2002.
The line graphs in Figure 4.1 show flow funding ratios and stock funding ratios
following a similar trend over the course of the sample period with both indicators
exhibiting declining ratios from FY 2002 to FY 2005, followed up an uptick in both ratios
onwards until FY 2007. The dramatic deterioration in both funding measures starting
around FY 2008 because of the financial crisis is noticeable.
Because flow funding is a function of how well the plan employer is fulfilling its
annual required contributions, the line graph in Figure 4-2 illustrates the persistent gap
between the annual required contribution rate (ARC) and the plan employer’s actual
contribution rate (AC).
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Table 4-1. Variable Descriptions, Sources, and Descriptive Statistics (100 State DB Plans,
FY 2002-FY 2010)
VARIABLE

LABEL

Std.
Dev.

DEFINITION

Mean

Employer contributions as a
percentage of the plan's annual
covered payroll
Employer's actual contribution
(AC) / Employer's annual required
contribution (ARC)
Actuarial value of plan assets
(AVA) / actuarial accrued liabilities
(AAL); in percent
Unfunded actuarial accrued
liability as a % of annual covered
payroll

10.16

9.23

90.50

31.32

82.40

16.58

natural log of DB plan net assets

16.23

1.13

5.27

12.36

7.99

0.37

5.69

3.12

12.03

10.43

0.54

n.a.

9.80

0.45

2.61

4.10

0.21

1.51

Dependent Variables

ac_acp

employer
contribution rate

flow

Flow Funding Ratio

stock

Stock Funding Ratio

uaal_acp

Unfunded liability

Plan Level Variables
ln_netasset
ln plan net assets
historicalret

1 year ROR

assumedret

discount rate

memcon_acp
arc_acp

member
contributions
ARC

made_arc

made ARC dummy

lnaveben

ln average benefit
payments
ratio active to retired

actret

Historical 1 year DB plan annual
investment return (%)
Assumed rate of return on plan
investments (%)
Member contributions as a % of
annual covered payroll
Employer's annual required
contribution rate expressed as a %
of annual covered payroll
Dummy variable indicating
whether plan sponsor paid 100%
of their ARC
Natural log of DB plan's annual
average benefit payments
Ratio of active plan members to
plan beneficiaries

State Fiscal Characteristic
gfbal_urpc1k
pcap
per capita unreserved General
GFbal_unreserved(1k) Fund balance ($1000s)

86.20 266.90

Note: All variables from state or plan CAFR except for made_arc and gfbal_urpc1k are
author's calculations
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Figure 4-1. Stock & Flow Funding, Unfunded Actuarial Accrued Liabilities, FY 2002-2010
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Figure 4-2. Employer & Employee Contribution Rates, FY 2002-2010
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With the fiscal year along the x-axis aligned vertically across both graphs, we see
how the changes in the gap distance between ARC and AC in Figure 4-2 visually relate to
flow funding levels in Figure 4-1. Having the annual covered payroll as a common scale,
we can compare the relative size of the two primary sources of pension contributions.
Figure 4-2 shows that plan member employees not only contribute less than plan
employers but also follow much more stable contribution rates as well.
By aligning vertically along the years on the x-axis, we can also observe the general
trend or shape of the line graph over time for flow funding in Figure 4-1 and its
relationship to that of the line graphs for ARC and employer contributions in Figure 4-2.
As the rate for ARC increases, so does employer contributions but at a lower rate,
creating gaps reflected in the shape of the line graph for flow funding over the sample
period as shown in Figure 4-2. The plan sponsors in my panel on average failed to
increase their contributions at the same rate as ARC, and this manifested in widening
the gap between required and actual employer contributions. When scaled by the
annual covered payroll, Figure 4-3 provides a dynamic view on the considerable impact
that investment returns have on annual pension plan revenues. This is made clear by
the relative size of investment returns compared to both employer and employee
contributions.
Apart from the sizeable share and impact on pension revenues, the volatility of
investment returns relative to the assumed rate of return for state pension plans in my
sample is displayed in Figure 4-4. One can also see the effect of the economic and
market downturns of 2001-2002 and 2007-2008 in the line graph of the historical oneyear rate of return variable. In practice, actuaries for state pension plans employ a
smoothing period by which to calculate the value of current assets based on an average
value of a selected number of past years. By averaging out the effects of increases or
decreases in market values each year over several years (generally four or five), the
effect of this approach is to smooth out or dampen the immediate impact of these
severe market drops or spikes in growth and spread it out over time. Because states
vary widely in their actuarial practice of smoothing gains and losses on invested assets,
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the impact of market changes over time also has varying perceived effects on state
funding levels (The Pew Center, 2007).28

Concluding Remarks
This chapter presented the research methodology and panel dataset used for
evaluating state DB pension funding. Empirical models were specified to analyze four
key funding outcomes at the plan level – the employer contribution rate, flow funding
ratio, stock funding ratio, and the relative size of unfunded liabilities. The fixed effects
panel regression approach was identified as the appropriate econometric strategy to
estimate the specified models. I specified and discussed the explanatory and control
variables along with a review of their use in past empirical studies. Descriptive statistics
of key DB funding variables for my sample of 100 state DB plans in Table 1 and the
graphs of their trends over the last decade in Figures 4-1 to 4-4 provided an empirical
overview on the hypothesized funding relationships that determine DB public pension
plan funding. First, it showed how the trend for stock and flow funding ratios were
opposite that of the unfunded liability indicator. Second, it showed that over the same
period, actual employer contribution rates failed to keep up with annual required
employer contribution rates, and that member/employee contribution rates were
relatively fixed and comprised a small share of annual plan revenues. The graphs also
illustrated the substantial role of investment income on plan revenues in terms of total
revenue share and volatility. Lastly, I noted the trend in total retirement benefit
payments increasing every year and its implications for future DB funding outcomes.
In the next chapter, I report and discuss the results of my panel regression models
used to test the various hypothesized DB state pension plan funding relationships.
Copyright © Cezar Brian Mamaril 2013
28

The Pew Center (2007) provides example of states that use longer smoothing periods like
Colorado (4 years) and California (15 years) to show how they retain good and bad years over
time. This is contrasted to states like Idaho, Illinois, Oregon and West Virginia, that are expected
to show dramatic year-to-year shifts because they use a fair market value approach over a short
smoothing period for valuing their major pension plans.
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CHAPTER 5
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION

In the previous chapter, I outlined the empirical methods used in this study to
evaluate DB state pension plan funding. Four panel regression models were specified to
examine the determinants of employer contribution rates (ac_acp), flow and stock
funding ratios (flow and stock), and the relative size of plan unfunded liabilities
(uaal_acp). I presented the panel dataset comprised of 100 state DB pension plans
covering fiscal years 2002 to 2010, along with the dependent and explanatory variables
in my panel regression models. Based on the initial review of the descriptive statistics
and graphs of annual aggregate trend, the explanatory variables reflect a positive
funding relationship with the first three dependent variables of interest (ac_acp, flow,
and stock) and an inverse relationship with the unfunded liability indicator (uaal_acp).
This implies that in general, the sign of the estimated coefficients from the ac_acp, flow
and stock panel regression models is expected to be opposite those of obtained from
the uaal_acp model.
In this chapter, I discuss the results of my panel regression analysis. Table 5-1
presents the estimated coefficients from the OLS and Fixed-Effects (FE) regression
models of employer contribution rates (Model 1) and flow funding (Model 2). Table 5-2
reports the panel regression results for my stock funding (Model 3) and unfunded
liabilities model (Model 4). In each table, the first and third columns report the
estimated pooled OLS coefficients while the fixed effects coefficient estimates are listed
in the second and fourth columns. I use the unbiased and consistent FE estimates for
inference while the OLS coefficients serve as a point of reference to compare my results
to the existing empirical public pension literature - the majority of which relied on
pooled OLS models to evaluate pension funding. Year dummies are included in all
model specifications and coefficient results are reported with clustered standard errors
at the state level and robust to cross-sectional heteroskedasticity and serial (withinpanel) correlation.
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Table 5-1. Estimated Coefficients of Fixed Effects: Employer Contribution Rates and Flow
Funding (100 State DB Plans, FY 2002-2010)
Model 1: Employer
Contribution Rate (%ACP)
OLS
Fixed Effects
ln Plan Net Assets
Member contribution
rate (%ACP)
ln Average retirement
benefit payment
Actives/Beneficiaries
ratio
1-yr investment rate
of return (%)
Discount rate (%)
Stock funding ratio (%)
Annual required
contribut'n rate (%ACP)
percap unres GenFund
balance ($1000s)
R2
rho
R2 within group
R2 between group
R2 overall group
F-test of joint significance

-0.672
(0.322)
-0.245
(0.108)
1.720
(0.831)
-0.033
(0.023)
-0.020
(0.019)
-3.109
(1.539)
-0.158
(0.053)
0.395
(0.154)
0.163
(0.059)
0.419

58.606

**
**
**

**
***
**
***

6.880
(3.035)
-0.092
(0.101)
-0.854
(0.609)
0.037
(0.035)
-0.035
(0.018)
-1.511
(1.027)
0.039
(0.051)
0.530
(0.123)
0.281
(0.030)
0.742
0.247
0.017
0.044
335.942

**

*

***
***

Model 2: Flow Funding %
(AC/ARC)
OLS
Fixed Effects
-3.518
(1.532)
-0.470
(0.478)
8.181
(4.025)
-1.057
(0.146)
-0.253
(0.104)
-14.294
(5.813)
-0.032
(0.124)
-0.758
(0.189)
0.646
(0.406)
0.118

33.625

31.135
(15.363)
-0.535
(0.637)
9.151
**
(7.050)
-0.529
***
(0.230)
-0.302
**
(0.125)
0.889
**
(6.268)
0.367
(0.236)
0.077
***
(0.334)
1.028
(0.224)
**

**

**
**

***

0.750
0.078
0.003
0.000
60.063

Notes: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
• ACP: annual covered payroll; Flow funding is the flow funding ratio (%), defined as the ratio of
actual employer contributions (AC) to annual required contributions (ARC); Stock funding ratio (%),
defined as the ratio of actuarial value of assets (AVA) to actuarial accrued liabilities (AAL); percap
unres GenFund balance is state per capita unreserved general fund balance. AC, ARC, & ACP are all
expressed in thousand dollars ($1000s).
• Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in the brackets below the
coefficient results; "rho" is the share of the estimated variance of the overall error accounted for by
the individual plan effect. All panel regression models include year dummies whose estimated
coefficients are not reported in this table due to space considerations but can be found in Appendix
A.
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Table 5-2. Estimated Regression Model Coefficients: Stock Funding and Unfunded
Actuarial Accrued Liabilities (100 State DB Plans, FY 2002-2010)

ln Plan Net Assets
Member contribution
rate (%ACP)
ln Average retirement
benefit payment
1-yr investment rate of
return (%)
Discount rate (%)
Actives/Beneficiaries
ratio
Employer contribution
rate (%ACP)
Made ARC dummy
percap unres GenFund
balance ($1000s)
R2
rho
R2 within group
R2 between group
R2 overall group

Model 3: Stock Funding
(AVA/AAL) %
OLS
Fixed Effects
2.764 **
25.906 ***
(1.288)
(7.344)
-1.045 ***
-0.681
(0.366)
(0.494)
-1.702
4.012
(3.200)
(3.161)
0.055
-0.083 **
(0.040)
(0.033)
-4.195
6.941
(3.673)
(4.220)
0.608 ***
-0.321 ***
(0.129)
(0.099)
-0.714 ***
0.041 *
(0.159)
(0.023)
7.132 ***
1.466 *
(1.860)
(0.751)
-0.086
-0.021
(0.233)
(0.060)
0.445
0.973
0.571
0.041
0.057
44.076
184.867

Model 4: Unfunded Actuarial
Accrued Liabilities (%ACP)
OLS
Fixed Effects
5.726
-30.782
(7.536)
(33.408)
2.252
-3.320
(2.027)
(4.073)
-17.440
21.195
(26.191)
(17.646)
-1.183 **
-0.917 *
(0.519)
(0.477)
9.538
-10.338
(6.823)
(14.852)
-0.173
-1.406 ***
(0.239)
(0.467)
0.020
-1.203 ***
(0.849)
(0.125)
-9.980
0.110
(8.093)
(3.786)
2.188 ***
2.700 ***
(0.745)
(0.509)
0.063
0.381
0.071
0.039
0.001
52.407
82.590

F-test of joint significance
Notes: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
• stock: stock funding ratio (%),defined as the ratio of actuarial value of assets (AVA) to actuarial
accrued liabilities (AAL); uaal_acp: unfunded actuarial accrued liability expressed as a percentage of
annual covered payroll (ACP), where UAAL=AAL-AVA; Employer contribution rate (%ACP); made_arc:
dummy variable = 1 if plan made 100% annual required contribution (ARC); percap unres GenFund
balance is state per capita unreserved general fund balance ($1000s).
• Model 4 dependent variable is first-differenced to eliminate the unit-root. Robust standard errors
clustered at the state level are reported in the brackets below the coefficient results; "rho" is the
share of the estimated variance of the overall error accounted for by the individual plan effect. All
panel regression models include year dummies whose estimated coefficients are not reported in this
table due to space considerations but can be found in Appendix B.
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To confirm the appropriateness of using the FE estimator, I calculated the t-statistic
from the correlation between the individual plan effect and the fitted values and its
standard error for each fixed effects regression model.29 For all four models, the results
indicate that the random effects were highly correlated with the independent variables
(i.e., the errors are correlated with the regressors) which would have yielded
inconsistent OLS and RE estimates.
Due to the time-series nature of my study’s dependent variables, non-stationarity in
panel data is also a concern as it results in invalid hypothesis testing of OLS and FE
coefficient estimates. I test for unit roots in the panel data for all four dependent
variables and find that the stationarity assumption does not hold for the uaal_acp
variable. I address this issue by taking the first-difference of uaal_acp and using its
transformed version as my dependent variable for Model 4.30

Defined Benefit State Pension Employer Contributions
To test the hypothesis that the state pension plan sponsors in my sample were
consistently underfunding their annual employer contributions, I examine the
relationship between ARC and the actual employer contribution rate (Model 1) and flow
funding ratio (Model 2). An increase in the annual required contribution rate is expected
to be directly related to the employer contribution rate but inversely related to the flow
funding ratio.
The FE coefficient estimate for ARC was highly significant in Model 1 but was not
statistically significant in Model 2. The results indicate that on average holding
everything else constant, a percentage point increase in the annual required
contribution rate results in a 0.53 percentage point increase in the actual employer
29

The t-stat calculated for each model is as follows: Model 1 (- 0.699/0.033)=-20.96; Model 2 (0.882/0.033)=-26.42; Model 3 (-0.863/0.033)=-25.86; and Model 4 (-0.617 /0.033)=-18.48.
30
The following is the inverse chi-squared (d.f. = 200) statistic result from the augmented
Dickey-Fuller unit root test using a lag structure of one for each dependent variable: ac_acp
(Model 1)=305.6; flow (Model 2)=618.52; stock (Model 3)=272.60 ; and uaal_acp (Model
4)=233.99. A Phillips-Perron unit root test also confirmed non-stationarity in the uaal_acp
variable.
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contribution rate. This finding is important because the arc_acp variable encapsulates
the actuarial valuation process into one indicator as to what is required of the plan
sponsor in the immediate/short-term funding period to maintain overall plan solvency.
As noted in Chapter 2, Keeping up with funding requirements was the first of five
identified categories of public pension policy reform efforts. The ideal policy response
would be a 1:1 increase between the ARC and the employer contribution rate. The
actual employer contribution response as implied by the results, somewhat follows Yang
and Mitchell (2005) who assert that public pension plan sponsors fundamentally exhibit
a “behavioral persistence” in underfunding contributions where, “…on average, public
plans do make an effort to fill in an underfunding gap over time, though not fully from
one year to the next” (p. 16).
The following variables were significant predictors of employer contribution rates
and flow funding ratios: the logarithm of plan net assets (ln_netasset); the one-year rate
of return on investments (historicalret), and per capita unreserved General Fund
balance (gfbal_urpc1k). The ratio of active members to beneficiaries (actret) was
statistically significant for flow funding ratio alone.
I find a positive significant relationship between the size of a plan’s net assets and
the employer contribution rate and flow funding ratio. This finding implies that sponsors
of plans with more net assets are able to contribute more and are better able to fund
their required contributions. Interestingly, the sign of the FE coefficients in Models 1
and 2 flip from positive to negative when estimated with OLS. The significant but
counterintuitive OLS results follows a similar negative relationship reported by Munnell
et al. (2008d) between total plan assets and the likelihood of a plan making 100 percent
of its ARC payment. The dramatic sign flip between the OLS and FE estimates with
respect to the effect of total plan net assets on employer contribution efforts illustrates
the bias that may arise from ignoring unobservable plan specific heterogeneity.
In contrast, the intuition underlying the signs of the FE coefficient estimate for the
effect of historicalret on ac_acp and flow remains fairly consistent even when estimated
under OLS. The results imply that an increase in the one-year rate of return is associated
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with a lower employer contribution rate and flow funding ratio. The result could be
interpreted in two ways. Because the bulk of annual pension revenues come from
investment returns, an improved investment performance should translate into a
favorable funding situation where the plan sponsor may not be required to contribute
as much as it would have otherwise. Alternatively, the favorable investment
performance inclines the plan sponsor to assume similar future trends. Hence, the plan
sponsor finds it acceptable to reduce its actual employer contribution because it
assumes future investment returns will make up for any contribution shortfall. In a
review of the pension funding literature, the only study to specify the investment rate of
return as a determinant of flow funding was Yang and Mitchell (2005), and they found
no statistically significant relationship between the two variables.
For the active to retiree ratio variable (actret), the results from my panel regression
analysis indicates that variable had no significant effect on the employer contribution
rate. In the flow funding model though, coefficient estimates for actret variable were
relatively robust, as both OLS and FE estimates show an increase in the proportion of
active employees relative to beneficiaries is associated with lower funding ratios ceteris
paribus. It may be that plan sponsors view the relationship between the employee
composition ratio and the exigency of their contribution obligations in temporal terms.
In other words, benefits earned by active employees are perceived as future obligations,
whereas having a greater proportion of retirees equates to more immediate funding
obligations since these are current liabilities that require paying off sooner rather than
later.
The coefficient for the per capita unreserved general fund balance variable
(gfbal_urpc1k) suggests higher employer contribution rates and flow funding ratios are
associated with state pension plans administered by states that record larger
unreserved general fund balances. The results are robust to both OLS and FE
specifications of the employer contribution rate model (Model 1) and provide empirical
support for the positive effect that state fiscal condition has on public pension
contributions. The result in Model 2 is consistent with the fiscal stress theme in the
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pension funding literature that show a positive association between favorable fiscal
conditions and the ability of state employers to contribute more into their funds. The
most recent example is from Munnell et al. (2008d, 2011c) who find that a higher debt
to GSP ratio makes it less likely that a plan sponsor pays the full ARC.
The coefficient result from the assumed rate of return (assumedret) was only
significant in the OLS specifications of employer contribution and flow funding. The OLS
result is consistent with Chaney et al. (2002) and Eaton and Nofsinger (2004) who
suggest public pension plan sponsors have an incentive to assume a higher discount rate
in order to lower contribution requirements. My results on the other hand show that
once we control for plan fixed effects, there is no evidence that the discount rate affects
the actual employer contribution rate, or that it further influences the public plan
sponsor’s tendency to underfund its required contribution.

Overall Funded Status of State Defined Benefit Pension Plans
In the second part of my empirical analysis, I examine the effect of the following
explanatory variables on plan stock-funding ratio (Model 3: stock) and unfunded
liabilities (Model 4: uaal_acp) respectively:






logarithm of average benefit payments (lnaveben)
employer contribution rate (ac_acp)
indicator variable whether full ARC payment was made (made_arc)
one-year rate of return on investments (historicalret)
plan member contribution rate (memcon_acp)
Based on the asset-liability framework in Chapter 3, holding plan membership and

assets constant, an increase in the average cost of retirement benefit payments is
expected to be associated with lower stock funding ratios and higher unfunded pension
liabilities. I fail to find any empirical support for this hypothesis with non-significant FE
and OLS coefficient results for lnaveben in both Model 3 and 4 (see Table 5-1). This
result complements Giertz and Papke (2007) who use a three year panel dataset of 85
state pension plans to examine various retirement benefit variables plans and found no
statistically significant effect on stock funding ratio as well. To date, the pension funding
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literature has not provided the empirical support for the widespread anecdotal
argument that benefit generosity and unfunded benefit enhancements contributed to
the pension funding crisis.
The FE coefficients for employer contribution rate (ac_acp) are statistically
significant and yield the expected sign in both the stock funding model (Model 3) and
uaal_acp (Model 4). The results indicate that raising the employer contribution rate
increases the plan’s stock funding ratio and reduces its uaal_acp. The significant and
positive relationship between the coefficient of the full ARC payment dummy variable
(made_arc) and stock funding ratio underscores the importance of fulfilling required
employer contributions. Simply put, the coefficient estimates for both variables (ac_acp
and made_arc), suggest that when the plan sponsor contributes more, one can expect
some improvement in a plan’s overall funded status.
I compare my results with the relevant empirical literature: Doyle (2005) who
examined the relationship between ac_acp and stock; and Coggburn and Kearney (2010)
who examined the relationship between ac_acp and state per capita unfunded pension
liabilities using aggregated state-level data for FY 2007. The Pooled OLS analysis by
Doyle (2005) indicated ac_acp was negatively associated with stock, which is the same
inference I get from my OLS coefficient result in Model 3. Doyle does not explain why
his finding contradicts his own hypothesis that ac_acp should be positively affect stock.
From an econometric standpoint, the OLS results in this case exemplifies the concern
over making erroneous inferences on the various pension funding relationships if we fail
to account for unobserved heterogeneity between the different public pension plans. As
for the relationship between ac_acp and state per capita UAAL, Coggburn and Kearney
(2010) found a percentage point increase in ac_acp was associated with a 123.84 dollar
increase in the per capita UAAL variable. The issue with their result though, is that they
frame the direction of causality from UAAL to ac_acp in their hypothesis, but in their
empirical model, they assume the opposite causal direction, ac_acp as a determinant of
UAAL. In short, Coggburn and Kearney inadvertently and implicitly convey the
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endogenous funding relationship between ac_acp and UAAL but fail to acknowledge or
address it econometrically.
Investment returns make up the largest proportion of pension revenues, therefore,
a higher rate of return is expected to raise a pension plan’s stock funding ratio and
reduce its unfunded liabilities. The estimated coefficient for the actual one year of
return on investments (historicalret) was statistically significant for both stock funding
(Model 3) and uaal_acp (Model 4) but did not display the expected sign in Model 3. My
FE coefficient results on the impact of investment returns on stock funding differs from
the OLS results of Yang and Mitchell (2005) who found a positive and statistically
significant relationship between the two variables.
I am uncertain as to why investment returns do not have the expected effect on
stock funding, but as postulated earlier, the common actuarial practice of public pension
of smoothing out investment returns may be contributing to this result. Some of that
effect may be reflected in the trends we observe for the stock funding line graph (Figure
4-1) and the line graph of the annual rate of return (Figure 4-4). It could be that the
effects of the market downturn in 2001-2001 at the beginning of my sample period
were still being incorporated into the stock funding values up to FY 2007, after which
both historicalret and stock trended downwards in the same direction. Another possible
explanation for the inverse relationship of historicalret and stock comes from the results
in Table 5-1 that suggest an inverse relationship between historicalret and employer
contribution behavior. Thus, any gains from investment returns, whose impact is already
smoothed out over several periods, were further offset by lower employer contribution
levels.
The non-significant coefficients for employee contribution rate (memcon_acp) in
both FE regression model specifications raise the question over the extent that raising
plan member employee contributions is an effective strategy for improving a plan’s
overall funded status. A review of the descriptive statistics of my panel dataset confirms
the relatively fixed nature of the employee contribution rate variable (memcon_acp) as
indicated by the small within group variation (variation over time for each individual
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plan) of the variable, much of which stems from employee contribution rates being
defined by statute or determined under collective bargaining (GAO, 2008; Peng, 2008).
Apart from the legal constraints to raising member contribution rates, vested public
pension plan members tend to resist any proposed increases in their contributions just
as robustly as they would any reductions to their benefits as was nationally played out
in Wisconsin (Cogan, 2011; Ferrara, 2012; Walsh, 2011). It is unremarkable then that the
majority of pension reforms enacted to raise employee contribution rates have largely
been limited to newer employee cohorts (Pew Center, 2012).
Although not the primary focus of my empirical evaluation, the estimated
coefficients of the control variables specified for Models 3 and 4 provide additional
insights into state DB retirement system funding. Starting with the discount rate variable
(assumedret), it was noted in previous chapters how the actuarial values of plan assets
and liabilities are sensitive to the choice of the discount rate. Nonetheless, the
estimated coefficient for assumedret was not statistically significant in any of the model
specifications. I partly ascribe this to the plans in my sample rarely changing their
discount rate assumptions during the sample period, and this was also reflected in the
small within-group variation for the variable.
More unclear is the sign of the estimated coefficient for the ratio of active members
to retirees variable (actret). I expected a positive correlation between actret and stock
as both followed a similar downward trend over the sample period with the crosssectional sample mean for actret steadily decreasing every year from a ratio of 3.52 in
FY 2002 to 1.98 in FY 2010. Past studies have shown a direct relationship between the
actret variable and stock funding (Eaton & Nofsinger, 2008; Giertz & Papke, 2007). It
was hypothesized that having more active employee members relative to retired
beneficiaries leads to a more favorable funding outcome due to greater revenue inflows
from more member contributions relative to cash benefit payment outflows. My
estimated FE coefficients for actret seem to infer contradictory results when Model 3
and Model 4 are considered together. Though Model 4 shows the expected inverse
relationship between actret and uaal_acp, the estimated coefficient in Model 3
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indicates an inverse relationship between actret and stock that contradicts both my own
hypothesis and the extant literature.
It could be that a greater share of the actuarial value of plan liabilities is coming
from the benefits accruing to active employees. It follows from the accrual accounting
of liabilities, the denominator in the stock funding measure includes the benefits
accrued by active employees and not just the retirement benefits paid out to current
retirees. Another possible reason for the negative effect of actret on stock builds on the
statistically significant inverse relationship between actret and flow obtained from
estimating Model 2 (see Table 5-1). Assuming a direct relationship exists between stock
and flow (albeit the unclear direction of causality), then the effect of actret on flow
serves as the indirect link to explain the significant effect of actret on stock.
The estimated coefficient for gfbal_urpc1k also produced mixed results in Models 3
and 4. If we take the results from Models 1 and 2, the estimated coefficient for
gfbal_urpc1k indicated a positive and statistically significant relationship with employer
contribution behavior both in terms of the nominal rate and flow funding ratio. Thus, we
expect gfbal_urpc1k to be positively related to stock and inversely related to uaal_acp.
Instead, I find that the coefficient for gfbal_urpc1k was significant only in the model for
unfunded liability, and did not yield the expected sign. The results were robust to both
OLS and FE specifications and implied gfbal_urpc1k is positively related to uaal_acp. In
reviewing the general trend for both variables in my panel data set, I find that state
general fund balance increased six out of the nine years in my sample period while
uaal_acp was steadily increasing over the same period. So while the association
between the two variables is apparent, the causal link is unclear. At this point, further
investigation is needed to determine why the unfunded pension liability would increase
for states that record a favorable fiscal condition such as an increase in the general fund
balance.
As for the non-significant effect of gfbal_urpc1k on stock, the result undermines the
use of my analytical framework in explaining the relationship between actret and stock
by using the effect of actret on flow as the indirect causal link. In this case though,
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whereas actret is a variable that factors in both short-term (flow) and long-term (stock)
actuarial calculations, gfbal_urpck1k is an exogenous non-actuarial factor. In other
words, the plan sponsor only considers current state budgetary conditions as reflected
in the unreserved general fund balance at the time it determines its level of employer
contributions. Again, just as with actret, further research is needed to determine why
differing and unexpected results are obtained for the effect of gfbal_urpc1k on stock
and uaal_acp.31

Discussion
In this chapter, I reported and discussed the estimated coefficient results from my
panel regression models of four DB state pension plan funding outcomes, namely: the
employer contribution rate, flow funding ratio, stock funding ratio, and the relative size
of plan unfunded liabilities. The results were discussed in relation to my hypotheses on
funding relationships and outcomes for those pension reform categories concerned with
increasing employee and employer contributions and reducing retirement benefit
payments. First, the results of my analysis indicate a statistically significant relationship
between employer contribution behavior and DB pension plan funding outcomes along
with evidence of the degree to which state government DB plan sponsors were
underfunding their annual required contribution requirements. Second, the results call
into question the potential effectiveness of reforms related to increasing employee
contributions and reducing retirement benefit payment reductions. I found that changes
in the employee contribution rate and the size of the average retirement benefit
payment had no statistically effect on overall plan funded status. Taken together, the
evidence underlines the fiduciary burden that states carry as sponsors of their
respective DB retirement systems. Since employee contribution rates and retirement
benefit payments are relatively fixed due to the legal protections afforded them,
31

Regression models using lagged values of selected explanatory and control variables were also
examined and yielded similar results. The only notable exception was the significant positive
effect of lagged gfbal_urpc1k on flow funding. Overall, the alternative model specifications did
not provide any substantial differences in the overall conclusions of the empirical analysis.

71

employer contributions become the primary recourse for states in covering funding
shortfalls that occur from dismal investment returns (Young, 2010). Even though an
increasing number of states are moving to increase employee contribution rates and
reduce the generosity of retirement benefits, the actuarial impact is expected to be
negligible as long as efforts are limited to new and future employee cohorts (GAO,
2012a).
Apart from the contribution and benefit payment variables, I also found empirical
support from the results in Model 4 that plans with higher investment returns and a
higher plan membership ratio of active employees to retirees are associated with lower
unfunded liabilities. As noted earlier, among the host of issues debated over public
pension funding, the size of the unfunded liabilities has received the most attention. The
results carry important implications in two policy areas for states trying to reduce if not
control the growth in unfunded pension liabilities. First, the overarching share of plan
assets sourced from investment income drives the efforts to continuously seek ways to
improve investment performance by linking it to governance reforms. Second, state
governments are dealing with the myriad consequences of a rapidly aging and retiring
workforce (Lewis & Cho, 2011; Toosi, 2012). This trend is manifesting itself in the
membership composition of state retirement systems where the ratio of retired to
active plan members is growing (Becker-Medina, 2011). We could expect a diminishing
percentage share of annual revenues from employee contributions. Moreover, states
face an increasing fiscal burden not just from having to close the funding gap for future
liabilities, but having to pay out retirement benefits in the current year.
Endogeneity of Public Pension Funding
Though not the focus of my hypotheses testing, I was unable to provide a clear
explanation for the unexpected sign of the statistically significant coefficient results for
historicalret and actret in the stock funding model. Instead, I proposed a partial
explanation for the inverse relationship of both variables with stock funding by referring
to the inverse relationship that both variables had with employer contribution behavior
in both cases. By using employer contribution behavior as the link to explain the non72

intuitive results in the stock funding model for historicalret and actret, my results
suggest endogeneity in employer contribution behavior. The endogeneity stems from
the dynamic adjustments that the plan sponsor is making in terms of its employer
contribution in response to the changes in other plan level characteristics and funding
components. Based on this supposition, the appropriateness of evaluating stock funding
in a static framework then becomes a concern. This is because traditional fixed effects
approach my control for the endogeneity from the unobserved plan-specific
heterogeneity, but it does not account for the endogeneity arising from the dynamic
adjustments occurring in the pension funding process. Therefore, an empirical
evaluation within a dynamic framework could therefore yield clearer insights into the
public pension funding process.
Using an abstract example to illustrate this point, consider my two-period model of
an underfunded DB plan illustrated in Figure 3-1 where the state government fails to
make the full ARC payment in the first period. In reality, the actual DB funding process
is more complicated as it involves a multi-period, year-round, ongoing, simultaneous
flow of employer and employee contributions into the fund and retirement benefits
paid out of the fund to plan beneficiaries. Broadly summarized, a state DB plan is a
dynamic and multi-faceted system where investments are managed year-round and
different sets of employee cohorts with multiple salary grade levels enter, leave, or get
promoted. From the plan actuary’s perspective, an actuarial valuation of plan assets and
liabilities from where the stock funding ratio and unfunded liability measure is
calculated, involves regularly updating actuarial projections, and accounting for multiple
investment horizons (a function of the investment portfolio) and different amortization
periods (e.g., whether closed or open).
A review of state and pension plan CAFRs show that in practice a time lag exists in
the valuation and financial reporting of stock and flow-funding components. Using my
two-period model example in Figure 3-1, I illustrate how this time lag becomes a source
of endogeneity for both stock and flow funding measures. First, let us assume
investment returns and employee contributions in current year t are exogenous revenue
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sources for current year assets. This leaves the third source of revenues, current year
actual employer contributions (AC) observed in year t. As the results reported in Table
5-1 indicates, AC is a function of the actuarially determined annual required
contribution (ARC) levels. We know by definition, ARC in turn is derived from the value
of assets and liabilities accrued (stock) from all periods prior to current year t, and that
both AC and ARC are components of the flow funding ratio (i.e., how the plan sponsors
responds to ARC in terms of its AC). Thus, by construction, flow funding is endogenously
determined. It follows then, that stock funding is endogenously determined since we
showed how past stock funding levels can affect current stock funding levels through
current employer contribution behavior.
Apart from employer contributions, if we consider that investment returns largely
determine stock funding, and if the assumption from the public pension literature holds
that governance practices influence investment performance (e.g., board directed
investment and asset-allocation policies), then it becomes even more clear how the
stock funding ratio, as an indicator of the overall funded status of a plan, is effectively
endogenously determined as well.
The paper by Yang and Mitchell (2005) is the only previous study to raise the issue in
general of endogeneity in public pension funding, where the positive correlation
between current and past stock funding ratios is traced to the endogeneity of
investment performance and persistence in overall pension funding levels. Their paper
postulated that endogeneity arises from flow funding being determined by stock
funding, and in turn, stock funding being determined by investment performance, with
investment performance endogenously determined by the governance practices
implemented. To model the possibility that current plan past plan funding outcomes
influence current funding, Yang and Mitchell include a lagged dependent variable in
their pooled OLS regression model of public pension plan stock funding ratios. Their
results suggested that a 1-percentage point increase in the stock funding ratio in a given
year was associated with a 0.76 percentage point increase the following year in the
stock funding ratio. The authors explain that Mitchell and Smith’s (1994) behavioral
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persistence hypothesis of public pension plan underfunding is partly explained by the
lack of regulations requiring public plan sponsors to fulfill their funding obligations. The
modeling approach by Yang and Mitchell (2005) essentially extends the static pension
funding model expressed in eq.4-1 to take the following general form:
𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1 𝑓𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑖𝑛𝑔𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝛽𝜿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛾𝑪𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜂𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(eq. 5-1)

For parsimony in notation, we denote fundingi,t as yi,t and combine ki,t and Ci,t into
Xi,t, and where μi,t = i + i,t , to write a more general form of the dynamic model in eq.
5-1 and express it as:
𝑦𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛿1 𝑦𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑿𝑖,𝑡 𝛽 + 𝑢𝑖,𝑡

(eq. 5-2)

Where yi,t is the plan’s funding ratio for plan i in year t; Xi,t is the matrix of timevariant explanatory variables that affect plan funding as specified in eq. 4-4, and μi,t is
the composite error consisting of the plan fixed effect i, and the random error term i,t
where 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ~𝑖𝑖𝑑(0, 𝜎2𝜀 ). While Yang and Mitchell claim the endogeneity issue is addressed
through the use of panel data and inclusion of a lagged dependent variable in their
regression model, their use of a pooled OLS estimator failed to address the endogeneity
due to unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity.
Econometrically, unobservable heterogeneity exists in Eq. 5-2 if E(ηi|Xi,t) ≠ 0. As
applied to public pension funding, unobserved heterogeneity becomes a source of
endogeneity if there are plan specific characteristics or factors that affect both stock
funding and explanatory variables (i.e., unobserved determinants are correlated with
the observables). Some examples of time-invariant state DB plan related variables that
may affect the various stock funding components include actuarial valuation methods
and employer sponsorship arrangements that exist for each plan. In our panel setting,
no matter how many plan-specific factors we may include in our regressor list, that is,
the right hand side of our regression equation, there may be some time-invariant
characteristics unique to each plan that affects the plan’s funding outcome that we fail
to account for. Omission of these variables will result in biased estimates.
As for simultaneity, econometrically this occurs in eq. 5-2 if E(εi,t|Xi,t) ≠ 0. Applied to
public pension funding, simultaneity exists when there is some feedback relationship
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between one or more independent variables and the stock funding variable (i.e., the
explanatory variables is jointly determined with the dependent variable). It could be the
case of bidirectional causality, or reverse causality, or that both variables are
simultaneously observed. For example, if we take the behavioral persistence hypothesis
of Mitchell and Smith (1994) that places the direction of causality from stock funding to
flow funding, then by construction, ceteris paribus, having more assets relative to
liabilities results in a lower ARC; making it more likely that the plan sponsor becomes
better able to contribute the full ARC payment. Equally conceivable though, is if the
plan sponsor is delinquent in meeting its full employer contribution, this would lower
the flow-funding ratio, and therefore negatively affect the stock-funding ratio.
Going back to eq. 5-2, if we follow Yang and Mitchell (2005) and apply simple OLS to
estimate the dynamic model with a lagged dependent variable, this will lead to
inconsistent and biased results in the presence of unobserved heterogeneity (Baltagi,
2008). This is because by construction, yi,t is a function of the fixed effect ηi, it follows
that the lagged dependent variable yi,t-1, is also a function of the fixed effect i and thus,
correlated with the error term μi,t . The correlation does not go away even if we increase
the number of individuals n in the sample or sample time periods T (Bond, 2002). One
can also show that the correlation between yi,t-1 and the fixed effect in i inflates or
biases upwards δ1 the coefficient of yi,t-1 (Lachenmaier & Rottmann 2011).
To eliminate the plan-specific effects ηi in our panel data, the standard approach is
to apply the fixed effects estimator as I did with my static models to obtain a demeaned
estimation equation. The consistency and unbiasedness of the FE estimator though
relies on a strict exogeneity assumption that current values of both the dependent and
explanatory variables are independent of their past realizations. The inclusion of Yi,t-1
violates this assumption. Hsiao (2003; section 4.2) and Wintoki et al. (2012) show how
applying fixed-effects estimation in the presence of a dynamic relationship results in
biased and inconsistent estimates. Even after removing the panel level means, the
transformed variables on the right hand side of eq. 5-2 will still be correlated with the
demeaned error term (𝜀𝑖,𝑡 − 𝜀̅𝑖 ). Lachenmaier and Rottmann (2011) show how this
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leads to a downward bias in the estimates of the lagged dependent variable. Even if
more regressors are included and the errors are not serially correlated, purging the
individual plan effects will not eliminate the dynamic panel bias; it essentially makes
every observation of the transformed y endogenous to the error (Nickel, 1981). Only
when T , the fixed-effects estimator is consistent in a dynamic panel model, which is
typically not the case in most panel data sets where T is fixed or relatively small (Bond
2002). A review of the empirical public pension funding literature shows Giertz and
Papke (2007), Doyle (2005), and Listokin (2007) were the only previous researchers to
apply the FE estimator in their respective panel regression models of stock funding.
However, all the empirical analyses were carried out within a static framework; none of
the researchers specified a lagged dependent variable in their respective regression
equations.
Fortunately, the development of several panel regression models provides us with
solutions to with the econometric issues that may arise from estimating a dynamic panel
model such as that specified in eq. 5-2. In the next chapter, I describe and implement an
empirical strategy that uses the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) framework for
evaluating the dynamic adjustments in DB public pension funding.
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CHAPTER 6
A DYNAMIC EMPIRICAL MODEL OF PENSION PLAN FUNDING

In Chapter 5, I presented and discussed the results of my state DB pension funding
panel regression models. The Fixed Effects (FE) estimator was identified as the
appropriate empirical strategy to control for time-invariant differences between the
individual plans in my panel dataset. OLS estimates were also presented to provide
comparable results from past studies that may have failed to properly account for the
endogeneity arising from unobserved heterogeneity. While the FE estimator
ameliorates the omitted variable bias, it does so at the expense of a strong exogeneity
assumption that current year values of my model’s explanatory variables are completely
independent of the past values of the dependent stock funding variable. This is an
assumption I argued is unrealistic if we consider the dynamic adjustments that occur in
the pension funding process.
This chapter builds on the discussion from the end of the last chapter by examining
the relationship between employer funding behavior and its effect on the overall
funding levels of state DB pension plans within a dynamic framework. The purpose of
this chapter is to outline an empirical strategy that demonstrates the use of a
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator proposed by Arellano and Bover
(1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) in estimating a dynamic panel model of state DB
plan stock funding ratios. To provide an empirical perspective on the need to consider
the dynamic nature of public pension funding, I discuss the results in relation to those
obtained from my FE panel regression model of stock funding in Chapter 5.

State DB Pension Funding as a Dynamic Process
Endogeneity, as it relates to dynamic adjustments in public pension funding, is
scarcely addressed in the literature. To show conceptually how stock funding and flow
funding are endogenously determined, I use the behavioral persistence hypothesis of
public pension funding by Mitchell and Smith (1994) as a starting framework. As earlier
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cited, this hypothesis predicts a positive unitary relationship between stock and flow
funding, where the level of stock funding determines the level of flow funding. But as
we also showed, current year flow funding, which essentially represents the plan
sponsor’s employer contribution behavior, is endogenously determined because it
occurs in response to ARC. ARC in turn, is a function of the previous year’s stock funding
level. Given how the abovementioned funding outcomes are constructed, one can see
how current year stock funding is affected by past values of stock funding through
current year employer contributions. Consequently, our empirical strategy will have to
deal not just with the endogeneity in public pension funding from unobserved
heterogeneity and simultaneity, but also the endogeneity that arises from the dynamic
nature of the DB public pension funding process.
Because applying OLS or Fixed Effects to estimate the dynamic model in eq. 5-2
leads to biased and inconsistent results, a GMM panel estimator is used instead to
examine the relationship between employer contributions and stock funding ratios. This
estimator exploits the dynamic relationship between the dependent and independent
pension funding variables in my model. The basic estimation procedure essentially
consists of two parts (Wintoki et al., 2002). The first part relates to using firstdifferencing to eliminate the fixed effects in the dynamic model in eq. 6-1 as first
proposed by Anderson and Hsiao (1981), whereas the second part relates to the GMM
estimator introduced in a series of papers that include Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano
and Bond (1991), Arellano and Bover (1995), and Blundell and Bond (1998).
Following the parsimonious approach to notation in eq. 5-2, we denote stocki,t in
eq.6-1 as yi,t and all the RHS independent variables are indicated by Xi,t, and write a
more general form of the dynamic model in eq.6-1 as:

yi,t = α + δ(yi,t-1)+ β (Xi,t) + ηi + εi,t

(eq. 6-1)

Where α is the constant term and δ is the estimated coefficient of our lagged
dependent variable. The first part of the estimation procedure is first-differencing both
sides of eq.6-2 such that:
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Dyi,t = α + δDyi,t-1+ β DXi,t + Dεi,t

(eq. 6-2)

The fixed effect i has been eliminated, but yi,t-1 in yi,t-1 correlates with i,t-1 which
is in i,t.; so, yi,t-1 is correlated with i,t by construction. Taking an IV estimation
approach, Anderson and Hsiao (1981) demonstrated that as long as i,t are not serially
correlated, one can use two-stage least squares (2SLS) from further lags to construct
valid instruments for the lagged dependent variable - either as level (e.g., yi,t-2) or
difference (e.g., yi,t-2) for yi,t-1. Arellano and Bond (1991) show that while the
estimator described by Anderson and Hsiao is unbiased and consistent, it is not the
most efficient, because it uses only a limited subset of all possible values of the
instrumental variables, and fails to take into account all the potential orthogonality
conditions. The 2SLS as applied in Anderson-Hsiao’s “first-difference IV” estimator also
creates a trade-off between the depth (i.e., number of time periods) of the estimation
sample and the lag distance (i.e., number of lags) used to generate internal instruments
(Roodman, 2009a).
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988) and Arellano and Bond (1991) improve upon the IV
estimation approach of Anderson and Hsiao (1981) by proposing a Generalized Method
of Moments (GMM) framework to estimate eq. 6-2. The Arellano-Bond estimator
utilizes all available past values of the dependent variable when creating instruments for
the lagged dependent variable without lag and sample depth tradeoff. Arellano and
Bond (1991) constructed their estimator, otherwise referred to as Difference GMM,
from moment conditions formed using lagged levels of yi,t, first-differenced errors, and
the first differences of strictly exogenous variables. Later work by Arellano and Bover
(1995) showed weak instruments though affected the asymptotic and small-sample
performance of the first-difference GMM estimator. When yi,t is close to a random walk
(i.e., past levels provide little information about future changes), it renders the
untransformed lags as weak instruments for transformed first-differenced variables.
Blundell and Bond (1998), building on the work of Arellano and Bover (1995),
augments the Arellano-Bond estimator by forming moment conditions using a system
containing both first-differenced and levels equations. When applied to my stock
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funding ratio model, this estimation strategy utilizes the lagged differences of the
endogenous stock and flow funding variables as instruments in the level equation (eq. 62) and the lagged levels of the endogenous variables in the first-differenced equation
(eq. 6-3), resulting in a “stacked” system of equations that includes equations in both
levels and differences:
𝑦𝑖,𝑡−𝑝
𝑦𝑖,𝑡
𝑿𝑖,𝑡
[Δ𝑦 ] = 𝛼 + 𝛿 [Δ𝑦
]+𝛽[
] + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 ,
Δ𝑿𝑖,𝑡
𝑖,𝑡
𝑖,𝑡−𝑝

p>0

(eq. 6-3)

The estimated coefficients are then obtained by solving the appropriate weighted
set of the moment conditions from eq. 6-1 and eq. 6-2.32
Using Monte-Carlo simulations, Blundell and Bond (1998) showed that the system
GMM (sGMM) estimator performed better than difference GMM in finite samples.
Blundell and Bond (2000) further showed that exploiting the additional moment
conditions in the levels equation improves the precision of sGMM estimates over
difference GMM when the dependent variable is persistent.
Both difference and system GMM can be applied in either one- or two-step variants
with robust standard errors (Baum 2006). In difference GMM regressions on simulated
panels, Windmeijer (2005) finds the two-step efficient GMM performs better than onestep in estimating coefficients, with lower bias and standard errors. However, Monte
Carlo studies such as those by Arellano and Bond (1991) have shown that the two-step
estimates of both difference and system GMM standard errors are severely biased

32

In system GMM, additional moment conditions can be added for endogenous variables whose
first-differences can be used as instruments (Cameron & Trivedi 2010). The moment conditions
created by assuming particular lagged levels of the dependent and other endogenous variables
are orthogonal to the differenced errors are sometimes referred to as “GMM” type moment
conditions, whereas those formed using strictly exogenous variables are sometimes referred to
as standard “IV-style” moment conditions (Roodman, 2009a). One can instrument the
endogenous variable using the same principle for instrumenting the lagged dependent variable.
For example, if an explanatory variable xi,t is endogenous, then valid instruments for xi,t in the
first-differenced equation is xi,t-2 and earlier realizations of xi. Valid instruments for xi,t in the
level equation is xi,t-1 and earlier realizations of xi,t.
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downwards in small samples.33 To address the downward bias in sGMM errors,
Windmeijer (2005) developed a small-sample correction to the covariance-matrix for
two-step standard errors and reported that his correction resulted in more accurate
standard errors; such that two-step estimation with the corrected errors appears
modestly superior to robust one-step GMM (Roodman, 2009a). Given the factors that
apply in my stock funding ratio model - short panel, a dynamic dependent variable, a
lack of good external instruments, along with the ability to instrument potentially
endogenous variables (e.g., ac_acp, made_arc) - the system GMM estimator offers a
dynamic panel solution to the problems of endogeneity stemming from simultaneity
bias, reverse causality, and omitted variables.

A Dynamic Model of Stock Funding
Following Yang and Mitchell (2005), I extend the static model expressed in Model 3
(eq. 4-4) by including a lagged dependent variable to account for the possibility that a
plan’s current overall funded status as indicated by the stock funding ratio is influenced
by past stock funding outcomes:

stocki,t = β0 + β1 (stocki,t-1)+ β2 (memcon_acpi,t) + β3 (lnavebeni,t)
+ β4 (ac_acpi,t) + β5 (made_arci,t) + γCi,t + λTt + ηi + εi,t

(eq. 6-4)

Where the dependent variable stocki,t is the plan’s stock funding ratio for plan i in
year t; stocki,t-1 is the lagged dependent variable; memcon_acpi,t is the employee
contribution rate expressed as a percentage of the annual covered payroll; lnavebeni,t is
the logarithm of a plan’s average benefit payment. In this equation, both flow funding
related variables, arc_acpi,t is the annual required contribution rate expressed as a
percentage of annual covered payroll, and made_arci,t, a dummy variable to indicate
whether the plan made its full annual required contribution.

33

One-step GMM estimators use weight matrices that are independent of estimated
parameters, whereas the efficient two-step GMM estimator weighs the moment conditions by a
consistent estimate of their covariance matrix (Windmeijer, 2005). The term “two-step” also
refers to the optimal weighting matrix constructed in the first-step estimation using an initial
consistent estimate of the parameters in the model (Windmeijer, 2005).
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The model shares the same set of control variables Ci,t as those specified in Model 3
from Chapter 5. These include actreti,t a control for plan member composition between
active and retired plan members; assumedreti,t the selected discount rate used in the
actuarial asset valuation; and historicalreti,t the one year actual rate of return on
investments. Tt is a vector of year dummies to control for any shocks common to all
state DB plans. Lastly, i is the unobserved plan fixed effect and i,t is the random error
term.
The model was fitted using the system GMM (sGMM) estimator by Arellano-Bover
(1995) and Blundell-Bond (1998) and implemented in STATA 12.1 using the xtabond2
user written command by Roodman (2009a). The two-step sGMM coefficient results are
reported in Table 6-1 using Windmeijer’s (2005) “finite-sample correction” to the robust
standard errors, along with the FE estimates obtained from my stock funding model as
reported in Table 5-2.
The xtabond2 user command allows us to specify our endogenous variables as
‘GMM’ style instruments and incorporate assumptions on which variables are strictly
exogenous (i.e., standard `iv’ instruments). In this model, the stock funding ratio and
both flow funding related variables arc_acpi,t and made_arci,t are assumed to be
endogenous. So, for our GMM style instrument set, each of the three identified
endogenous variables are instrumented using lagged values (i.e., lagged levels and
lagged differences) up to year t-4, and the year dummies are identified as standard IV
style instruments (i.e., treated as exogenous). To ensure the statistical validity of the
instruments used, the results of the AR(2) and Hansen J test are also reported in Table
6-1.
Assessing the Specification of the GMM model
The consistency of the GMM estimator will depend on the absence of serial
correlation in the error term and the validity of the instruments. I use the Arellano-Bond
test for autocorrelation to test the hypothesis that the idiosyncratic error i,t is not
serially correlated.
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Table 6-1. Fixed Effects and System GMM Model of Stock Funding Ratios (100 State DB
Plans, FY 2002-2010)
Stock Funding (AVA/AAL) %
Fixed Effects
System GMM
0.732 ***

stockt-1
ln Plan Net Assets

25.906
(7.344)
-0.681
(0.494)
4.012
(3.161)
-0.083
(0.033)
6.941
(4.220)
-0.321
(0.099)
0.041
(0.023)
1.466
(0.751)
-0.021
(0.060)
0.571

Member contribution rate (%ACP)
ln Average retirement benefit payment
1 yr investment rate of return (%)
Discount rate (%)
Actives/Beneficiaries ratio
Employer contribution rate (%ACP)
Made ARC dummy
percap unres GenFund balance ($1000s)
R2
AR (1) test p-value
AR (2) test p-value
Hansen J-test p-value
No. of instruments

***

**

***
*
*

(0.069)
2.335
(1.202)
-0.561
(0.452)
-3.870
(3.944)
0.509
(0.151)
1.340
(3.106)
1.645
(0.673)
0.075
(0.035)
1.745
(1.086)
-0.172
(0.346)

*

***

**
**

0.001
0.607
0.543
111

Notes: * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<0.01
• stock: stock funding ratio (%),defined as the ratio of actuarial value of assets (AVA) to
actuarial accrued liabilities (AAL); made_arc: dummy variable = 1 if plan made 100% annual
required contribution (ARC); percap unres GenFund balance ($1000s): state per capita
unreserved general fund balance
• AR(1) and AR(2) are tests for first-order and second-order serial correlation in the firstdifferenced residuals, where Ho: no serial correlation; Hansen test of over-identification
where Ho: all instruments are valid. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are
reported in the brackets below the fixed effects coefficient results while the two-step
standard errors for the System GMM estimated values are robust to the Windmeijer (2005)
correction for finite-sample heteroskedasticity. All panel regression models include year
dummies whose estimated coefficients are not reported in this table but can be found in
Appendix C.
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By construction, we expect first-order serial correlation in differences since i,t is
mathematically related to i,t-1 via the shared term i,t-1. Hence, we are interested in
the result of the second-order correlation in differences between i,t-1 in i,t and i,t-2 in
i,t-2. To test for this, Arellano and Bond (1991) recommend using the AR(2)
autocorrelation test of the null hypothesis that there is no second-order autocorrelation
in the residuals of the equation in differences. The AR(2) test yields a p-value of 0.607
which means we cannot reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation.
Next, I use the robust Hansen (1982) J statistic test for overidentification to test the
joint validity of the overidentifying restrictions on the GMM estimator. It is the most
common diagnostic in GMM estimation used to assess the appropriateness of the model
specification (Baum 2006).34 Rejecting the null hypothesis under this test implies the
instruments do not meet the required orthogonality conditions – because either the
instruments are not truly exogenous or they are being excluded incorrectly from the
regression (Baum 2006). The results in Table 6-1 indicate a J-statistic with a p-value of
0.543 and as such, we cannot reject the hypothesis that our instruments are valid.
Apart from testing the validity of the full instrument set (i.e. entire set of
overidentifying restrictions), I also test the validity of a subsets of instruments (i.e.,
GMM style and standard IV style instruments) using the difference-in- Hansen test. The
test, also referred to by Hayashi (2000) as the C-statistic, is distributed 𝒳 2 with degrees
of freedom equal to the loss of overidentifying restrictions under the null hypothesis
that the specified variables are proper instruments (Baum et al., 2003). The results for
these specification tests are reported in Appendix C and they confirm the statistical
validity of my GMM and standard IV instruments. Appendix E provides a more detailed
discussion of the system GMM model diagnostic and specification tests used in my
analysis.

34

The Hansen J-Test is used instead of the Sargan Test since the distribution of the Sargan test is
only known when the errors are independently and identically distributed. Arellano and Bond
(1991) show that the one-step Sargan test over-rejects in the presence of heteroscedasticity and
autocorrelation, and a tendency to under-reject when applied after the two-step estimator
under the same conditions.
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Results and Discussion
A cursory review and comparison of the FE and sGMM coefficients reported in Table
6-1 reveal some notable results. First, the highly significant sGMM coefficient of the
stock funding lagged dependent variable confirms the importance of including it in the
specification. Conversely, it also suggests omitted dynamics in any static empirical
model specification.
The sGMM estimates in Table 6-1 suggest that on average, holding everything else
constant, that a 1-percentage point increase in the previous year’s stock funding ratio is
associated with a 0.732 percentage point increase in the current year’s stock funding
ratio. This result suggests past funding outcomes have a major influence in determining
current and future plan funding outcomes.
Conversely, when we consider the past research, the result implies a concern for
omitted dynamics in any static model specification of stock funding ratios. Even apart
from sGMM results, we get some indication of the importance of accounting for
dynamics in pension funding by just looking at the changes in the R2 when we add the
stock funding ratio lagged dependent variable to our FE and OLS models. The R2 rises
from 0.445 in the static OLS model to 0.929 in the dynamic OLS model, and from 0.057
in the static FE model to 0.417 in the dynamic FE model (see Table 6-1 and Appendix C).
Additionally, in comparing the three dynamic model specifications in Appendix C, one
would note that the estimated sGMM coefficient of the lagged dependent variable lies
between the FE and OLS estimates, where FE_stockt-1< sGMM_stockt-1<OLS_stockt-1
(0.591<0.732<0.939). This illustrates Bond’s (2002) discussion of how applying the FE
estimator to a dynamic model would bias downwards estimated the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable, and upward biased when simple OLS is applied to a dynamic
model.
When the relationship between employer contribution behavior and overall plan
funding is evaluated under the FE model, the results indicated that both flow funding
related variables - the employer contribution rate ac_acp, and making the full ARC
payment - were positively related to stock funding ratio. In particular, the estimates for
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ac_acp were particularly robust to both model specifications. The positive relationship
between ac_acp and stock is even more pronounced under the sGMM model when we
account for pension funding dynamics. The estimated coefficient for ac_acp goes from
0.041 (p<0.10) under the FE model to 0.075 (p<0.05) under the sGMM model. The other
flow related variable, made_arc, was only significant under the FE model (p<0.10) and
not under the sGMM.
After controlling for the endogeneity of both stock and flow funding treat
instrumenting for the endogeneity of our flow funding related variables, the results
suggest that how much the plan sponsor actually contributes into the plan affects
overall funding levels matters more than whether the plan sponsor merely makes the
full ARC payment. This finding diverges from my hypothesis that ascribes the growing
funding gap in DB state PERS to the recurring failure of states to contribute the full ARC,
that is, where the flow funding ratio is less than 100%. So what might account for the
non-significance of the made_arc variable? One possible reason is related to employer
contribution policy and the nature of the variable itself. The funding policy norm for the
majority of public pension plans is full payment of the actuarially determined ARC but at
the same time, most states are not legally required to pay the full ARC every year (Peng
2008).
We know that from Munnell et al. (2008d, 2011c) that actuarial valuation method
and state fiscal condition affect the likelihood that states make the full ARC payment.
Both studies further add that anywhere from half to two-thirds of plans who failed to
pay the full ARC, cite legal constraints (whether binding or non-binding) as the primary
barrier to making the full contributions. Plan actuaries likely incorporate these factors
into their annual valuations whenever they determine the future stream of ARC flows. If
we take into context an objective of maintaining a certain level of funding, the
assumption is that the plan sponsor consistently pays the full ARC each year moving
forward. Holding all other plan funding variables constant, it follows then that whenever
the plan sponsor fails to pay the full ARC for any given year, plan actuaries will re-adjust
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or re-calculate their plan valuations based on the actual employer contribution rate
(AC).
As for the other two reform-linked funding components of interest in this study,
memcon_acp and lnaveben, neither variable showed a significant relationship with stock
funding ratio. The sGMM results would suggest that even after accounting for the
dynamic adjustments in pension plan funding, increasing the employee contribution
rate and reducing the size of average plan benefits on average ceteris paribus, might not
have the intended policy reform impact of increasing a plan’s stock funding ratio. The
results are fairly robust if we consider the same result is confirmed in the dynamic
specifications of the OLS and FE model (see Appendix C).
Taking an actuarial perspective, the practice of smoothing out investment returns to
lessen the volatility of ARC rates ensures that the impact of annual investment returns
and actual employer contribution rates gets spread over several periods. By contrast,
employee contributions and benefit payouts represent single period shocks to plan
funding levels. With employee contributions, the rates are relatively fixed and they
generate a smaller share of annual pension revenues, and consequently implies an even
smaller share of the present value of total accumulated assets. A similar principle
applies to the liability side from changes in the level of retirement benefits. This is
because current liabilities at market value are comprised mostly of retirement benefit
payouts to current retirees in current year t. From an actuarial perspective, when the
full stream of accrued benefits from both active employees and future retirees are
considered for t-n and t+n periods, the value contributed by a single year of benefit
payouts to the total value of actuarial liabilities is substantially less.
Although not the focus of my study, the sGMM coefficient results for the plan level
variables still have important funding implications for state DB retirement systems. For
example, consider the 1-year investment rate of return variable historicalret, and the
ratio of active to retired members variable actret. Unlike the FE coefficient results, the
sGMM estimates for both variables show the expected positive relationship with stock
funding ratio. The result for historicalret unremarkably confirms the importance of
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investment returns in determining state DB plan funding levels, but the size of the
estimated coefficient does raise some interest. The sGMM coefficient results indicate
that a 1-percentage point increase in the 1-year rate of return on investments is
associated with a 0.509 percentage point increase in a plan’s stock funding ratio. The
magnitude of estimated relationship is notable since for most public pension plans, a
percentage point increase in historicalret represents a substantial amount of additional
revenues. At the same time, the coefficient result may just reflect the moderating effect
from the prevalent actuarial valuation method of smoothing out investment returns
Just as consequential is the statistically significant positive relationship between
actret and stock. I noted earlier how the ratio of active to retired members for my panel
of state DB plans decreased continuously every year between FY 2002 and FY 2010 from
3.52 down to 1.98. This trend reflects the increasing number of retiring state and local
government employees and an aging workforce in general. When re-stated, the trend
points towards an increasing proportion of retired to active plan member employees,
one that will pose major funding concerns for state governments. States face increasing
retirement system funding pressure in two areas every year moving forward: dwindling
percentage share of revenues coming from active plan member contributions, and
annual increases in total pension annuities that state governments by law are required
to pay no matter what.
Despite carrying the expected sign, the assumedret variable falls short of statistical
significance under both the FE and sGMM models. The non-significant results fail to
provide empirical support to the suggestion drawn from past studies like Eaton and
Nofsinger (2004) that states manipulate actuarial assumptions to record favorable
funding outcomes. Even if the assertion is tied in with political and fiscal factors, a
review of the CAFRs and actuarial reports of the plans in my sample showed very few
instances when plans instituted a discount rate change during the 9 year period covered
by my panel. I noted earlier how this is reflected in the very small panel within-group
variation of the assumedret variable. Nonetheless, because the assumed rate of return
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is the key assumption that drives the actuarial valuation of plan assets, this issue will
remain a major focal point in the debate over public pension plan funding.
In controlling for plan size in terms of plan net assets (ln_netasset), the estimated
coefficients were significant in both the FE and sGMM model but the difference in the
coefficient size is immediately apparent. The dramatically smaller sGMM estimate
suggest that the actual effect on current stock funding from changes in current net asset
holdings may be inflated in the FE model due to omitted dynamics. Interestingly, the
same changes in coefficient size is noted between the static and dynamic FE and OLS
models, where the ln_netasset coefficient is much smaller in the dynamic specification
(see Appendix C). Setting aside the bias and inconsistency of the dynamic OLS and FE
specifications, the similar changes observed for ln_netasset when it is specified under
the dynamic version of all three estimators lend evidence to the importance
incorporating past funding outcomes in any pension funding empirical model.
Finally, the coefficient for my unreserved general fund balance variable gfbal_urpc1k
was not significant in either the FE or sGMM model. When considered across all model
specifications, the results are consistent with my analytical framework that showed
annual state fiscal indicators would be more directly associated with employer
contribution behavior than with overall plan funding. Virtually all empirical public
pension studies have incorporated some type or variation of a fiscal indicator in their
analysis. Overall though, the results are mixed, with no general consensus over which
fiscal indicator best determines flow funding.

Concluding Remarks
In this chapter, I extended my static framework of analyzing public pension funding
by specifying a dynamic panel regression model of DB state plan stock funding ratios. I
was interested in determining the effect on the overall funded status of state DB plans
from changes in my reform-linked funding components as they relate to employer and
employee contributions and average retirement benefits. I demonstrated the use a
GMM estimator to control for potential endogeneity issues ignored in past empirical
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studies, particularly unobserved plan heterogeneity, simultaneity, and endogeneity with
respect to dynamic adjustments in the pension funding process. My system GMM model
considered the endogeneity of stock and flow funding and utilized lagged values to
instrument these variables. I discussed the results from my dynamic model and
compared them to those obtained from my fixed effects stock funding ratio model.
The highly significant coefficient of the stock funding lagged dependent variable
point to the importance of past funding outcomes in determining current overall
funding levels. The significant positive relationship between employer contribution rate
and stock funding ratio is robust to both static and dynamic model specifications. The
result confirms the fiduciary role of state governments, as demonstrated in their
employer contributions, in ensuring the solvency of their respective DB retirement
systems. Otherwise stated, what matters most in the end is how much the state
government actually contributes into its respective DB plans.
The member contribution rate and average benefit variable were not significant in
both the FE and sGMM model, essentially reflecting the nature of this two variables and
the way they are incorporated into the actuarial valuation process. From a policy
standpoint, the results imply the limited effectiveness of increasing employee
contribution rates and reducing the annual cost of pension annuities to improve overall
plan funding levels.
The sGMM model also indicated the positive effect of investment performance and
active to retired plan membership ratio on stock funding ratio. The results shed insight
into incorporating dynamics in modeling public pension funding in view of the actuarial
practice of smoothing out investment returns and an aging public employee workforce.
Finally, it should be noted that the system GMM estimator is not a panacea for all
dynamic endogeneity related panel data issues. Indeed, Roodman’s (2009b) warns
about the automated sophistication in the way researchers might utilize the system
GMM estimator. While the system GMM estimator offered an appealing solution to the
problems I faced in estimating a dynamic model of public pension funding, including,
“the combination of a short panel, a dynamic dependent variable, fixed effects, and a
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lack of good external instruments” (Roodman, 2009b, p. 256), it also comes with serious
limitations. To help reduce the likelihood of invalid results being generated, Roodman
(2009a, 2009b) stressed that researchers need to consider carefully the way they specify
the instruments used for their regressions and for transparency, report all results from
the relevant model diagnostic tests.
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CHAPTER 7
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RESEARCH PROSPECTS
Dissertation Summary
The purpose of this dissertation is to provide an empirical evaluation of Defined
Benefit (DB) state retirement system funding. As indicated in Chapter 1, DB state
pension plans play a major role in the country’s labor and financial markets. The
motivation for this study conveys the widespread concern over these critically
underfunded retirement systems, and state efforts to reform various funding aspects of
their respective DB pension plans. A review of annual state pension related legislation
reveals a growing impetus for reform in recent years, among an increasing number of
states, to address the pension underfunding issue. Reforms fall under five broad
categories identified by the Pew Center on the States (2010b), and they are: (1) keeping
up with funding requirements; (2) increasing employee contributions; (3) reducing
benefits; (4) improving governance and investment oversight; and (5) sharing the risk
with employees. The saliency of the reforms is reflected in the fiduciary role of states in
ensuring adequate funding for their respective DB plans. By design, the state
government fulfills this role by covering any pension funding shortfalls through
employer contributions. This raises the question of what determines the actual
employer contribution rates, particularly as it relates to meeting annual required
contributions. Is there empirical support for the hypothesis that state DB pension plan
sponsors underfunded their contributions? The other research question in this study
deals with determining an analytical link between each reform category and a specific
DB plan funding component. Is there empirical support for the hypothesis that improved
funding outcomes from reforms can be linked to increasing employer and employee
contributions and reducing benefits?
In Chapter 2, I discuss the rationale behind the various reforms and provide recent
examples from each pension reform category. The importance of investment income in
determining overall plan funding levels is a likely reason why much of the related
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research has focused on examining investment performance and overall funding as a
function of governance practices and state fiscal condition. I noted the major constraints
of directly examining the impact of specific individual reform on a plan’s funded status.
As an alternative, a framework was proposed to evaluate the funding impact from each
reform category by linking it analytically to a specific DB plan funding component.
This framework is presented in Chapter 3 using a balance-sheet approach to
describe the DB plan funding structure and process. The asset-liability framework
incorporates the various DB pension plan funding concepts and key measures in relating
each pension reform category to a specific DB plan funding component. I paid particular
attention to the funding outcomes affected by reform categories related to reducing the
cost of retirement benefits, increasing employee contributions, and meeting annual
employer funding requirements. There were four plan funding outcomes of interest in
this study, namely, the employer contribution rate (ac_acp); flow funding ratio (flow);
stock funding ratio (stock); and the unfunded actuarial accrued liability as a percentage
of a plan’s annual covered payroll (uaal_acp). I illustrated an example where my
framework could be used to model the impact of employer contributions on the overall
funded status of a DB plan.
In Chapter 4, I outlined and described the empirical modeling of DB state pension
funding, and the estimation strategy for examining employer contribution behavior and
the relationship between improved funding outcomes from changes in the reformlinked DB plan funding components. Using a panel of 100 state administered DB pension
plans from 50 states over a nine-year period FY 2002-2010, I empirically tested the
following hypotheses using fixed effects (FE) panel regression models:
(1) The hypothesis that states are underfunding their respective DB state plans as
indicated by their response (AC) to the annual funding requirement (ARC).
(2) The hypothesis that increasing employer and employee contributions and
lowering benefit payments are associated with higher plan funding ratios and
lower plan unfunded liabilities.
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I presented and discussed my results in Chapter 5 in two parts. In the first part, I
analyzed the determinants of employer contribution rates (Model 1) and flow funding
ratios (Model 2). I found strong evidence that state DB pension plan sponsors underfund
their annual required employer contributions. Specifically, the results from my empirical
analysis indicate that a percentage point increase in the annual required contribution
rate is associated with only 0.530 percentage point increase in the actual employer
contribution rate. The results in both my employer contribution rate model (Model 1)
and flow funding ratio model (Model 2) also suggest a significant positive relationship
between state fiscal condition and the ability of states to make its employer
contributions.
The results from my stock funding ratio model (Model 3) and unfunded liability
model (Model 4) formed the second part of my empirical analysis. When considering
pension reforms related to changes in employer and employee contributions, my results
provide empirical support for the critical relationship between employer contributions
and favorable plan funding outcomes. Specifically, increasing the employer contribution
rate and making full ARC payments significantly increase plan stock funding ratio and
lower the relative size of the unfunded liabilities. On the other hand, I find no significant
influence from the employee contribution rate (memcon_acp) on any of the plan
funding outcomes. I also found no evidence that changes in the average benefit variable
(lnaveben) had any significant effect on either the stock funding ratio (stock) variable or
the unfunded liability variable (uaal_acp). The non-significant results for memcon_acp
and lnaveben are attributed to the statutory environment and legal constraints that
largely limit member contribution rate increases and benefit reductions to new
employees. Subsequently, the overall impact on improving public plan funding
outcomes from such policy reform efforts is expected to be minimal.
At the end of Chapter 5, I discussed the limitations of using a static analytical
framework for evaluating public pension funding given the inherently dynamic nature of
the DB funding process. Specifically, I highlighted the endogenous funding relationship
between employer contribution behavior and the overall actuarial funded status as
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measured by the stock funding ratio. Traditional fixed effects may ameliorate our
control of endogeneity arising from unobserved plan heterogeneity, but it is not an
appropriate estimator in the presence of dynamic endogeneity. To this point, Yang and
Mitchell (2005) were the only researchers to consider the dynamic and endogenous
components of public pension funding. However, their attempt to estimate a dynamic
model of stock funding ratio using simple pooled OLS raises potential econometric
concerns that are noted as well in Chapter 5.
The need for an appropriate estimation strategy in evaluating a dynamic model of
public pension funding becomes apparent when we consider the endogenous funding
relationship between stock and flow funding. Such an estimation strategy is proposed in
Chapter 6, where I presented a dynamic model for analyzing state DB plan stock funding
ratios. Specifically, the GMM estimator, as proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998),
offered a dynamic panel solution to the problems of endogeneity stemming from
simultaneity bias, reverse causality, and omitted variables. This system GMM estimation
strategy utilizes the lagged differences of the endogenous variables (i.e. stock and flow)
as instruments in the level equation, and the lagged levels of the endogenous variables
in the first-differenced equation, resulting in a stacked system of equations that includes
equations in both levels and differences. For inference purposes, I used the estimated
coefficients from the two-step system GMM (sGMM) with Windmeijer’s (2005) finitesample correction to the robust standard errors. Specification tests were run to ensure
that statistical validity of the instruments used for the endogenous stock and flow
funding related variables. The sGMM results were also discussed in relation to the FE
results of my stock funding ratio model from Chapter 5 (Model 3).
There were four notable results to mention from the analysis in Chapter 6. The first
relates to the highly significant relationship between past and current funding
outcomes. This would suggest a concern for omitted dynamics in any static model
specification of stock funding ratios. Second, the significant positive relationship
between employer contribution rate and stock funding ratio was robust to both static
and dynamic model specifications. The result confirms the fiduciary role of state
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governments, as demonstrated in their employer contributions, in ensuring the solvency
of their respective DB retirement systems. Third, the sGMM results continue to call into
question the effectiveness in improving funding outcomes by implementing reforms
related to increasing employee contribution rates and/or reducing the total cost of
annual retirement benefit payouts. Lastly, the sGMM estimates indicated the positive
effect of investment performance and active to retired plan membership ratio on stock
funding ratio. The results point to the value of incorporating dynamics in modeling
public pension funding. This is especially important as we find evidence that overall plan
funding levels are affected by the aging public employee workforce and the actuarial
practice of smoothing out investment returns as a means of reducing employer
contribution rate volatility.
Conclusion and Implications for Policy and Future Research
In summary, the results of my empirical analysis suggest that increasing a state DB
plan’s stock funding ratio or reducing its unfunded liabilities centers around the plan
sponsor’s ability to increase employer contributions and making full ARC payments.
These findings have budgetary implications for state governments attempting to reform
their seriously underfunded DB retirement systems. This is because the guaranteed
nature of these retirement benefits means that state governments are ultimately
responsible for covering any funding shortfall (Forman 2009; Young 2006).
Questions are being raised though over the ability of states to cover shortfalls and
sustain the solvency of their retirement systems through increased employer
contributions in view of current and long-term fiscal challenges. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office projects that state and local governments will incur operating
deficits of up to $163 billion from 2010 to 2011 (GAO 2010). Therefore, any state effort
to raise their DB plan employer contribution rates will greatly be constrained by the
ongoing economic downturn in which declining state and local revenues are
accompanied by increasing demand for public services. As Peng (2004) concisely puts it,
“Because pension contributions come out of the general fund, they directly compete
with other government programs for the limited resources in the general fund. Pension
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contributions, however, do not have the same immediacy and urgency as other
government programs” (p. 62).
The problem is that although the state government can defer from fulfilling its
pension funding requirements, it cannot do the same with its annual benefit payments
to its current retirees. Widely publicized examples of how annual retiree benefit
payments are adding to the fiscal pressures faced by governments in states like
California, Illinois, and New York would imply that currently due retirement obligations
seemingly trump “other government programs” in the General Fund (e.g., Crane, 2010;
Walsh & Schoenfeld, 2010; Lowry, 2010). Just as daunting if not questionably feasible, is
the option of pursuing reductions in the current level of retirement benefits accruing to
active employee members, thereby lowering the average benefit payments due in
future periods. This is why the majority of policy reforms undertaken to reduce
retirement benefits are limited to new and future employees and essentially serve to
lessen the rate of increase in unfunded liabilities.
Unless the economy and financial condition of states improve and effective pension
reforms can be instituted, severely underfunded retirement systems will only increase
the costs of paying out these retirement benefits with every year that passes. That cost
eventually coming in the form of resources reallocated away from important programs
such as education, health, and public safety.

Study Limitations and Future Research
The empirical analysis in this study was limited to examining the effect on our
funding outcomes from contributions and benefit payments. Nonetheless, the
estimated coefficients for some of the control variables in my econometric models raise
some interesting results that warrant further investigation.
The first relates to the effect that state fiscal conditions may have on pension plan
funding. The extant empirical literature strongly supports a positive relationship
between higher stock and flow funding levels and favorable state fiscal condition. In my
analysis, I used as my fiscal indicator, the per capita unreserved General Fund balance,
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expressed in $1000s (gfbal_urpc1k), to represent the link described by Peng (2008)
between the state’s general fund and its pension contribution activities.
My results indicate a significant association between gfbal_urpc1k and ac_acp and
flow but not with stock. If we consider Peng’s (2008) Fiscal Stress Hypothesis of public
pension funding (i.e., in times of fiscal stress, states contribute less), there is a stronger
theoretical argument to be made in linking state fiscal condition with flow funding
related outcomes than with the stock values that account for long-term plan solvency.
This is why I find the significant positive relationship between gfbal_urpc1k and
uaal_acp, to be unexpected given the inverse relationship of uaal_acp with ac_acp and
flow on uaal_acp (i.e., higher employer contributions should reduce the unfunded
liability ceteris paribus). Additional research using a whole range of fiscal and economic
variables should help provide a more definitive picture of state fiscal influence on plan
funding levels.
The empirical approach utilized in this study can also be expanded to include the
dynamic modeling of DB public plan investment performance. Unlike the FE model, the
estimated coefficients for my historicalret variable (along with the actret variable)
yielded the expected coefficient signs under the system GMM model. Not surprisingly,
the result essentially confirms the established link between investment returns and
pension plan funding. Public pension plans are major players in the capital markets, and
accordingly their asset allocation decisions and investment portfolio performance are
constantly and extensively monitored and analyzed. In comparison, very few studies
have used longitudinal data to examine how governance determines investment
performance. Three of those studies, Albrecht and Lynch (2007), Doyle (2005), and Yang
and Mitchell (2005) used pooled cross section data from the 1990s to show how a whole
range of governance variables – from board composition, management practices,
reporting practices, to investment practices - were significantly related to the
investment performance of public pension plans.35 However, empirical analyses that

35

As mentioned throughout Chapter 4, all three studies used the same set of PENDAT survey
files described in page 44.
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properly account for the endogeneity of these governance variables are still lacking in
the literature. Future research in this area can yield new insights into the relationship
between governance and public pension funding.
As it relates to the fourth and fifth Pew Center identified pension reform categories
that address investment performance and investment risk, a follow-up analysis using a
GMM framework similar to the one I used for plan stock funding ratios may shed
additional insights into the dynamic and endogenous relationship between governance
and investment performance. With a more recent panel dataset, we can explore how
governance has affected investment performance in the past decade, as well as
evaluate the potential impact of efforts to professionalize the investment oversight and
management of public pension funds.
Other Post-Employment Benefits (OPEBs)
Lastly, one important area where empirical research on public pension funding is still
lacking is the evaluation of state efforts to reform Other Post-Employment Benefits
(OPEBs). On top of having to guarantee their sizeable regular pension obligations, states
are facing added fiscal pressure in trying to find ways to fund OPEBs. These benefits
were historically financed on a Pay-as-You-Go (PAYGO) basis but after GASB 43/45 were
issued in 2004, states are now required to account for their OPEB costs and funding on
an accrual basis using similar actuarial methods and reporting standards used in valuing
their regular DB pension plans (Kearney et al., 2009). By complying with GASB 43/45,
states are disclosing a more complete picture of the true cost of financing their
respective OPEBs. The picture is a grim one if we consider recent Pew Center (2012)
estimates of the total unfunded OPEB liability at around $627 billion, apart from the
estimated $757 billion in unfunded regular pension benefits, within the context of a
poor economic climate, workforce demographic trends, and escalating healthcare costs
(GAO, 2012a,2012b).
Depending on the magnitude of their OPEB liability, the implication of the annual
required contribution under GASB 45 is that state governments will now have to
contribute significantly more per year to finance other post-employment benefits
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compared to what they would have paid on an annual PAYGO basis. GASB 45 does not
require states to set up the kind of irrevocable trust funds used for their defined benefit
pension plans, it does contain incentives for states to pre-fund their OPEB liabilities. This
includes the use of a higher discount rate to value their OPEB obligations, consequently
reducing the size of their annual required contributions. We see some evidence of states
responding to this incentive as OPEB trust funds were set-up in 13 states in 2007 alone
(see Table 3). Applying the same framework of finite operating budget resources to
state OPEB funding, this raises questions about the potential budget trade-offs between
state contributions into DB pension plans vs. OPEB trust funds and current payments of
regular pension benefits and OPEBs to current retirees.
There is growing anecdotal evidence that a combined trend of fiscal pressures
caused by employer contributions to pre-fund OPEB and regular pension trust funds
along with substantial annual OPEB and regular pension payments to current retirees
will have an adverse impact on the financial condition of state budgets. This raises
potential endogeneity issues that future research can address.
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APPENDICES
Appendix A. Complete Results for OLS and Fixed Effects Specification of Employer
Contribution Rate and Flow Funding Ratio
Model 1: Employer
Contribution Rate (%ACP)
OLS
Fixed Effects
ln Plan Net Assets
-0.672 **
6.880 **
(0.322)
(3.035)
Member contributions
-0.245 **
-0.092
(0.108)
(0.101)
ln average benefit
1.720 **
-0.854
(0.831)
(0.609)
Actives/Beneficiaries
-0.033
0.037
(0.023)
(0.035)
1 yr ROR (%)
-0.020
-0.035 *
(0.019)
(0.018)
Discount rate
-3.109 **
-1.511
(1.539)
(1.027)
Stock Funding (%)
-0.158 ***
0.039
(0.053)
(0.051)
ARC (% ACP)
0.395 **
0.530 ***
(0.154)
(0.123)
percap unres GenFund
0.163 ***
0.281 ***
balance ($1000s)
(0.059)
(0.030)
Set of year dummy variables
yr 2002
1.415
0.258
(1.158)
(1.070)
yr 2003
0.722
0.408
(0.986)
(1.040)
yr 2004
0.987
0.297
(0.961)
(0.872)
yr 2005
0.335
-0.695
(0.766)
(0.472)
yr 2006
0.967
-0.724
(1.064)
(0.613)
yr 2007
2.789
-0.091
(1.966)
(1.071)
yr 2008
1.691 **
-0.316
(0.735)
(0.812)
yr 2009
.
0.430
.
(0.416)
yr 2010
-0.364
.
(0.373)
.
Constant
37.96 *
-90.03 *
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Model 2: Flow Funding %
(AC/ARC)
OLS
Fixed Effects
-3.518 **
31.135 **
(1.532)
(15.363)
-0.470
-0.535
(0.478)
(0.637)
8.181 **
9.151
(4.025)
(7.050)
-1.057 ***
-0.529 **
(0.146)
(0.230)
-0.253 **
-0.302 **
(0.104)
(0.125)
-14.294 **
0.889
(5.813)
(6.268)
-0.032
0.367
(0.124)
(0.236)
-0.758 ***
0.077
(0.189)
(0.334)
0.646
1.028 ***
(0.406)
(0.224)
11.606
(4.797)
9.970
(5.309)
7.014
(4.297)
1.958
(3.969)
4.349
(4.452)
9.555
(5.718)
7.497
(4.351)
.
.
2.940
(3.042)
193.92

**
*

*

**

14.835 **
(6.746)
13.992 *
(7.686)
7.449
(4.952)
-0.707
(3.161)
-1.846
(3.175)
-1.915
(4.120)
-1.304
(5.043)
-0.737
(3.164)
.
.
-540.13 **

Observations (n)
R2
rho
R2 within group
R2 between group
R2 overall group
F- test of joint
significance

(18.99)
898
0.419

(49.04)
898

(75.55)
898
0.118

0.742
0.247
0.017
0.044
58.606

335.942

(266.9)
898
0.750
0.078
0.003
0.000

33.625

60.063

Note: AC-Actual employer Contribution ($1000s); ARC-annual required contribution ($1000s); ACPAnnual Covered Payroll ($1000s); Note: AC-Actual employer Contribution ($1000s); ARC-annual
required contribution ($1000s); ACP-Annual Covered Payroll ($1000s); percap unres GenFund balance
($1000s) - is the unreserved general fund balance scaled by the state's population & expressed in
thousand dollars. Robust standard errors clustered at the state level are reported in the brackets
below the coefficient results; "rho" is the share of the estimated variance of the overall error
accounted for by the individual plan effect. All panel regression models include year dummies whose
estimated coefficients are not reported in this table but can be found in Appendix A.

Appendix B. Complete Results for OLS and Fixed Effects Specification of Stock Funding
and UAAL
Model 3: Stock Funding
(AVA/AAL) %
OLS
Fixed Effects
ln Plan Net Assets
2.764 **
25.906 ***
(1.288)
(7.344)
Member contributions
-1.045 ***
-0.681
(0.366)
(0.494)
ln average benefit
-1.702
4.012
(3.200)
(3.161)
1-yr ROR (%)
0.055
-0.083 **
(0.040)
(0.033)
Discount rate
-4.195
6.941
(3.673)
(4.220)
Actives/Beneficiaries
0.608 ***
-0.321 ***
(0.129)
(0.099)
Employer contributions
-0.714 ***
0.041 *
(0.159)
(0.023)
Made ARC dummy
7.132 ***
1.466 *
(1.860)
(0.751)
percap unres GenFund
-0.086
-0.021
balance ($1000s)
(0.233)
(0.060)
Set of year dummy variables
yr 2002
8.825 ***
17.07 ***
(2.158)
(2.865)
yr 2003
5.396 **
13.126 ***
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Model 4: Unfunded Actuarial
Accrued Liabilities (%ACP)
OLS
Fixed Effects
5.726
-30.782
(7.536)
(33.408)
2.252
-3.320
(2.027)
(4.073)
-17.440
21.195
(26.191)
(17.646)
-1.183 **
-0.917 *
(0.519)
(0.477)
9.538
-10.338
(6.823)
(14.852)
-0.173
-1.406 ***
(0.239)
(0.467)
0.020
-1.203 ***
(0.849)
(0.125)
-9.980
0.110
(8.093)
(3.786)
2.188 ***
2.700 ***
(0.745)
(0.509)
.
.
16.148

.
.
16.411

yr 2004
yr 2005
yr 2006
yr 2007
yr 2008
yr 2009
yr 2010
Constant
R2
rho
R2 within group
R2 between group
R2 overall group
F- test of joint
significance

(2.033)
3.789
(2.075)
2.251
(1.796)
3.378
(1.742)
5.472
(1.867)
3.733
(0.940)
.
.
-2.626
(1.172)
91.82
(32.13)
0.445

44.076

*

*
***
***

**
***

(2.988)
8.187
(2.350)
3.745
(1.630)
1.684
(0.921)
.
.
-2.713
(0.639)
-3.121
(1.441)
-5.057
(1.503)
-432.50
(132.3)

***
**
*

***
**
***
***

(12.919)
19.873
(20.466)
-2.234
(9.169)
-9.139
(9.378)
-11.873
(10.927)
-24.768 **
(11.444)
.
.
6.665
(10.100)
12.803
(82.87)
0.063

0.973
0.571
0.041
0.057
184.867

52.407

(19.853)
22.899
(22.417)
2.813
(4.840)
-0.372
(4.689)
.
.
-12.319
(14.414)
5.936
(10.550)
9.261
(7.943)
419.85
(565.3)
0.381
0.071
0.039
0.001
82.590

Note: AC-Actual employer Contribution ($1000s); ARC-annual required contribution ($1000s); ACPAnnual Covered Payroll ($1000s); percap unres GenFund balance ($1000s) - is the unreserved general
fund balance scaled by the state's population & expressed in thousand dollars. Model 4 dependent
variable is first-differenced to eliminate the unit-root. Robust standard errors clustered at the state
level are reported in the brackets below the coefficient results; "rho" is the share of the estimated
variance of the overall error accounted for by the individual plan effect. All panel regression models
include year dummies whose estimated coefficients are not reported in this table but can be found in
Appendix B.

Appendix C. Complete Results for System GMM specification of Stock Funding
Depvar: Stock Funding
Stock Fundingt-1

ols (n=896)

0.939 ***
(0.021)

ln Plan Net Assets

ln average plan benefit payments
1 yr ROR on investments (%)

0.397

13.323 ***
(4.117)

-0.112

-0.190

(0.069)

(0.208)

-0.611

1.187

(0.558)

(1.444)

0.117 **
(0.051)

Assumed rate of return (%)

0.591 ***
(0.055)

(0.249)
Member Contributions (% ACP)

fe (n=896)

0.022
(0.037)

-1.246 ***
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1.788

sgmm (n=896)
0.732 ***
(0.069)
2.335 *
(1.202)
-0.561
(0.452)
-3.870
(3.944)
0.509 ***
(0.151)
1.340

(0.423)
Actives/Beneficiaries Ratio

(1.568)

-0.079 **

-0.031

(3.106)
1.645
(0.673)
0.075
(0.035)
1.745
(1.086)
-0.172

(0.036)

(0.032)

(0.346)

0.169 ***
(0.022)

Employer Contributions (% ACP)

(0.040)

0.084 ***
(0.017)

made ARC dummy
percap unres GenFund balance
($1000s)
Set of year dummy variables
yr 2002
yr 2003
yr 2004
yr 2005
yr 2006
yr 2007
yr 2008
yr 2009
yr 2010
Constant
R2
rho
r2_w
r2_b
r2_o
F- test of joint significance

-0.067
0.116 ***
(0.025)

0.199

0.044

(0.332)

(0.466)

-3.776
(1.133)
-3.911
(0.848)
-3.401
(0.711)
-2.52
(0.541)
-0.916
(0.508)
.
.
-1.233
(1.220)
-3.284
(1.721)
-3.364
(0.714)
13.311
(5.910)
0.929

***
***
***
***
*

*
***
**

F(18,49)=3185.93
Pr>F=0.001
System GMM Model Diagnostics (Stock Funding)
Arellano-Bond test for AR(1) in first differences
Ho: No first-order serial correlation in residuals
Arellano-Bond test for AR(2) in first differences
Ho: No second-order serial correlation in residuals
Hansen J-test of overidentifying restrictions

8.986
(1.827)
7.494
(1.648)
5.594
(1.236)
4.107
(0.798)
3.953
(0.784)
3.486
(0.930)
1.560
(1.065)
0.641
(1.196)
.
.
-213.908
(67.319)

***
***
***
***
***
***

***

0.940
0.755
0.380
0.417
F(18,49)=791.94
Pr>F=0.001

Ho: Specified model and all overidentified instruments are valid (i.e. exogenous)

Difference-in-Hansen tests of exogeneity of instrument subsets:
Hansen test excluding system-GMM instruments for levels
Ho: GMM differenced- instruments are exogenous
Exogeneity of GMM instruments for levels
Ho: system-GMM instruments are exogenous and increases Hansen Jtest
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7.365
(3.341)
2.132
(1.987)
-1.013
(1.257)
1.587
(1.194)
2.731
(0.878)
1.703
(0.887)
10.489
(2.962)
10.995
(4.450)

**
**

**

***
*
***
**

0.133
(25.484)

F(18,99)=67.98
Pr>F=0.001
z = -3.31
Pr > z = 0.001
z = 0.51
Pr > z = 0.543
chi2 (92) = 89.90
Pr > chi2 = 0.543
chi2 (68) = 81.12
Pr > chi2 = 0.132
chi2 (24) = 8.77
Pr > chi2 = 0.998

Hansen test excluding standard “IV” instruments
chi2 (84) = 89.60
Ho: GMM instruments without ”IV” instruments are exogenous
Pr > chi2 = 0.318
Exogeneity of standard “IV” instruments
chi2 (8) = 0.30
Ho: Standard “IV” instruments are exogenous and increases Hansen JPr > chi2 = 0.999
test
Details on Instruments used in System GMM Model of Stock Funding
EQUATION / Instrument Type
IV
GMM
First Differences Equation
Diff. (year
Lag (1-4). stock ac_acp
dummies)
made_arc
year dummies
Levels Equation
Diff. (stock ac_acp made_arc)
Number of instruments 111

Appendix E. Technical Overview: Implementing System GMM in Stata and Comments
on Model Diagnostic Tests
In this section, I discuss in more detail how I implemented dynamic GMM estimation
in Stata (Version 12.1) using Roodman’s (2009) user written command xtabond2. I also
comment on the statistical diagnostic tests used to assess the appropriateness and
validity of my system GMM pension funding stock funding ratio model.
Implementing System GMM in Stata
Using the user written command xtabond2, I obtained the system GMM results, as
reported in Table 6-1, using the following code in Stata:
xtabond2 stock lagstock ln_netasset memcon_acp lnaveben
historicalret actret ac_acp made_arc gfbal_urpc1k y02 y03
y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10, gmm(stock ac_acp made_arc,
lag(1 4)) iv(y02 y03 y04 y05 y06 y07 y08 y09 y10) twostep
robust small
As specified in eq.6-4, the lagged dependent variable `lagstock’ is included as an
explanatory variable. The `gmm’ option invokes our lagged instrument set. In this case,
the command incorporates the assumption that the stock funding ratio, employer
contribution rate, and “made 100% ARC payment” dummy variable are endogenous (i.e.
`gmm style’ instruments) , and “( lag(1 4)” invokes instruments from lag periods t-1 up
to t-4 respectively. All the year dummies are assumed to be strictly exogenous, hence
the `iv style’ command option.
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Comments on Model Diagnostics
The xtabond2 command also reports the results of several diagnostic tests used to
check the validity of the GMM model and instruments used. My discussion draws from
the approach outlined by Efendic et al. (2010). When considered altogether, the results
provide empirical verification on the appropriateness of my system GMM model
specifications and the validity of the instruments used.
F-test of Joint Significance
The first statistical test is the F-test of joint significance of independent variables
which tests the null hypothesis that the independent variables are jointly equal to zero.
The F-test result indicates we reject the null hypothesis that independent variables are
jointly equal to zero at any conventional level of significance. Assuming the statistical
validity of the model, the independent variables in the dynamic panel regression
collectively explain variations of the dependent variable.
First-Order and Second-Order Serial Correlations
These serial correlation tests of the null hypothesis of no first or second order serial
correlation are sometimes referred simply as “AR(1)” and “AR(2)” respectively.
Assuming the validity of our specification, by construction, the residuals of GMM
estimates in first differences should be correlated, but there should be no serial
autocorrelation in second differences. The AR(2) test result for my sGMM model of
stock funding confirms no second-order serial correlation.
Hansen J-test of over-identifying restrictions
The exogeneity of the instruments is a crucial assumption for the validity of GMM
estimates. The dynamic panel GMM estimator uses multiple lags as instruments. This
means that our system is over-identified and allows us to implement a Hansen test of
over-identification. The Hansen J-statistic is the value of the GMM objective function
evaluated at the efficient GMM estimator 𝛽̂𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀 (Baum, 2006). Under the null that that
moment conditions are valid:
2
𝐽(𝛽̂𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀 ) = 𝑁𝑔̅ (𝛽̂𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀 )′𝑆̂ −1 𝑔̅ (𝛽̂𝐸𝐺𝑀𝑀 ) ∼ 𝒳𝑙−𝑘
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where the matrix ̂
𝑺 is estimated using the two-step method. The J statistic is
asymptotically distributed as 2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of
overidentifying restrictions L-k rather than the total number of moment conditions (L).
Essentially, k degrees of freedom are spent in estimating the coefficients ẞ (Baum,
2006; p. 201). For my system GMM model, the Hansen test of overidentifying
restrictions fails to reject the null at any conventional level of significance. This lends
evidence that the instruments used in my specification are valid.
The difference-in-Hansen test for GMM instruments and standard IV instruments
While the Hansen test for overidentification evaluates the entire set of
overidentifying restrictions, the “difference-in-Hansen” or “C statistic” tests the validity
of a subset of instruments. The statistic is computed as the difference between two
Hansen statistics (Baum et al., 2003): that for the (restricted, fully efficient) regression
using the entire set of overidentifying restrictions, versus that for the (unrestricted,
inefficient but consistent) regression using a smaller set of restrictions, in which a
specified set of instruments are removed from the set.
For excluded instruments, this is equivalent to dropping them from the instrument
list, and for included instruments, treating them as endogenous regressors by placing
them in the list of included endogenous regressors. The C test, distributed 𝓧𝟐 with
degrees of freedom equal to the loss of overidentifying restrictions (i.e. number of
instruments in the subset being tested), has the null hypothesis that the examined
instruments are exogenous, and thus, proper instruments (Baum et al. 2003).
Results from all the difference-in-Hansen tests fail to reject the null hypothesis of
exogeneity of any GMM instruments and the validity of standard IV instruments.
Cross section dependence
The validity of GMM estimators also rest on the assumption that disturbances are
cross-sectionally independent. While cross-sectional dependence is often encountered
in macroeconomic and financial panels with long time series where failure to account
for cross-unit dependency may lead to misleading inference, it has also been shown to
impact short dynamic panel estimators (Baltagi, 2005; Sarafidis & Robertson, 2009). As
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common unobserved shocks is one source of potential heterogeneous error cross
section dependence across pairs of cross section units (Sarafidis et al. 2009), I include
year dummies in my system GMM model specifications as a way to remove universal
time-related shocks from the error term.
Sarafidis et al. (2009) proposed a two-part method for detecting cross section
dependence in GMM panel data models with a large number of cross-sectional units (N)
and relatively small number of time series observations (T). The test combines assessing
results from the second order serial correlation test and a difference-in-Hansen test.
They show how rejecting the null in the AR(2) test may be an indication of potential
heterogeneous error cross section dependence. Sarafidis et al. recommend in one
applied example, that after a significant AR(2) test result, to check if the diagnostics
from difference-in-Hansen test are worse for the dynamic panel specification after time
dummies are excluded. According to them, this would lend evidence of cross section
dependence.
Following the above discussion, AR(2) tests for all my model specifications reveal no
evidence of error serial correlation and following the diagnostic procedure put forth in
Sarafidis et al. (2009), implies possibly no heterogeneous error cross section
dependence as well.
Bond’s OLS-GMM-FE estimators check
A cursory check of estimator validity in a dynamic panel model was proposed by
Bond (2002) who noted that the GMM estimated coefficient of the lagged dependent
variable should lie between that of the Fixed Effects estimates (which is biased
downwards) and the OLS estimates (which is biased upwards). The FE<SGMM<OLS
lagged stock funding ratio dependent variable coefficient results (0.440<0.725<0.908)
shows that the system GMM coefficient estimate lies between the lower bound of the
fixed effects model and upper bound of the OLS model. Following Bond’s (2002)
suggestion to compare FE-GMM-OLS coefficient estimates of the lagged dependent
variable lend further support to the appropriateness of my system GMM model
specifications.
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The test for “steady state” assumption
The improved efficiency as a result of the exploitation of additional moments in
system GMM relies also on a mild mean stationarity assumption on the initial conditions
(Blundell & Bond, 1998). According to Roodman (2009a), this means that changes in the
instrumenting variables or deviations from long-term values are not systematically
related to the fixed-effects. This is the assumption that enables us to include the levels
equations in our GMM estimates and use lagged differences as instruments for these
levels. In effect, Roodman points out the sampled individuals are in a “kind of steadystate” throughout the study period. Results from an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root
test indicate that the stock funding variable is stationary. In an applied setting, for the
system GMM model specification to be valid, the absolute value of the estimated
coefficient of the lagged dependent variable signifies convergence by having an absolute
value less than unity (Blundell & Bond, 1998; Roodman, 2009b). The system GMM
estimates of the lagged funding ratio dependent variable exhibit this property (0.701 <
1).
Identifying the choice and number of instruments
Problems associated with dynamic short panel econometrics such as weak
instrumentation and instrument proliferation can lead to invalid results that appear
valid. To address this concern, Roodman (2009b) strongly recommends reporting the
number of instruments generated for each regression and results from all specification
tests. While there are no clear or standardized rules on what determines “too many”
instruments in GMM estimation, Roodman (2009a), mentioned some “rules of thumb”
or “telltale” signs as it relates to instrument count and validity, they include: (1) when
the number of instruments outnumber individuals in the panel; and (2) a perfect Hansen
J-test statistic p value of 1.00. My empirical estimation adheres to both criteria. The
number of instruments is less than the number of individual plans in the sample (95 <
100 plans), and the Hansen J-test p values indicate failure to reject the null at any
conventional level of significance (p=0.229) and they are far from a perfect p value of 1.
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